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In

1986

Guatemala

authoritarian rule*
process,

but

experienced

a

from

Many issues affected the democratization

I argue that an essential

military relations.

transition

aspect was

civil-

Thus, the principal question answered in

this thesis is:

How have civil-military relations determined

the

nature

extent

and

of transition towards

democracy

in

Guatemala from 1986-1990?
Adopting Alfred Stepan’s model to examine civil-military
relations, the prerogatives and contestation of the Guatemalan
military were examined.

Prerogatives exist when the military

assumes the right to control an issue,

while contestation

involves open articulated conflict with civilian government.
High military prerogatives and low contestation indicate a
situation of unequal civilian accommodation, where civilians
do not effectively control the military.

Civil-military

relations

in

Guatemala

from

1986-1990

reflect a pattern of unequal civilian accommodation*

This

illustrates the lack of civilian control over the military and
continued
Guatemala.

military

dominance

of

the

political

system

in
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
During

the

1980s,

a

wave

of

transitions

authoritarian rule swept through Latin America.
the

legacy

of

brutal

military

regimes,

from

In light of

prospects

for

democratization after the installation of civilian government
have been discussed at great length.

Many authors argue that

the characteristics of civil-military relations will determine
the success of transition.

This thesis,

a case study of

Guatemala’s recent transition from authoritarian rule, will
utilize existing literature as a guide for examination of a
specific case.

Following Alfred Stepan, I will argue that an

essential aspect of democratization concerns civil-military
relations.

In short, I maintain that to deepen the process of

democratization,

civilian

rulers

must

establish

effective

control over the military.1

Thus, the principal question to

seek

How

have

and

nature

to

answer

determined

the

is:
extent

civil-military
of

relations

transition

towards

democracy in Guatemala from 1986-1990?

1Alfred Stepan, Rethinking
and the Southern Cone (Princeton:
1988), 128.
1

Military Politics:
Brazil
Princeton University Press,

This thesis will attempt to accomplish several things.
First,

a

review

of

relevant

literature

will

assess

the

usefulness of different approaches in examining civil-military
relations.

Also, an examination will be made of the effect of

United States military assistance on the transition process.
Finally, an effort will be made to illuminate the prospects
for

civilian

governance

in

Guatemala

as

affected

by

the

dynamics of civil-military relations in the period following
direct military rule.
For purposes of this thesis, a transition will be defined
as political change from an authoritarian regime to a liberaldemocratic

one.

Transitions

could

also

occur

through

revolutionary change; however, the transitions to be examined
here will consider only movements toward civilian democracies
through elections.
In the democratic transition model, one
"departs"
from
autocratic
regimes
(illegitimate administrations, controlled
by
the
military,
that
resort
to
repressive mechanisms to manage civilian
society) and "arrives" at legitimate,
civilian-controlled governments, whose
relations with civilian societies are
based on consent.2
Liberalization,

an opening of the system and loosening of

control, can occur without democratization.

For purposes of

2Gabriel Aguilera, "The Armed Forces, Democracy, and
Transition in Central America," in The Military and Democracy:
The Future of Civil-Militarv Relations in Latin America, eds.
Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S.R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990), 23.
2

this thesis, democratization will refer to the movement of a
society towards a representative form of government responsive
to the preferences of its citizens regardless of the source or
content.3 More

precisely,

democratization

implies

open

contestation for control of the government with free elections
which decide who governs.4
Military
commonplace,

governments
but

their

in

duration

Latin

America

have

been

and

stability

have

often

proved temporary.5 These periods of military rule profoundly
influence the process of governance which follows a retreat to
the barracks.
attention
governors.

to

The literature on the military devotes much
coups

and

the

performance

Few works are available,

of

however,

officers

as

which assess

civil-military relations during the period after a transfer
from military to civilian government.

In examining civil-

military relations after or during a transition,

it may be

useful to know what brings the military to government and why
it chooses to intervene.

Also, it will be useful to consider

the nature

of

this military

operates.

After a review of the main factors

3Robert Dahl,
Press, 1971), 1-2.

Polvarchv

and the

society

(New Haven:

in which

it

leading to

Yale University

4Stepan, 6.
sEric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), 138; and Alain Rouquie, The
Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1987), 345.
3

military withdrawal from politics the chapter discusses civilmilitary relations during the change to civilian government
and after*

LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES AND PRAETORIAN SOCIETIES
Huntington
America

may

not

proposes
be

that

fully

the

armed

professional

forces

of

institutions,

Latin
but

relative to other groups in society, they are often the most
coherent.

Possessing

an

organizational

coherence,

the

military is often the only group in society which, in times of
economic

or

political

crisis,

is

able

to

control

the

government apparatus.6 Much of the literature focuses on why
the military intervenes in politics*

Authors, such as Samuel

Huntington, argue that military rationale for intervening in
politics rests in a sense of mission to protect the nation.
This may mean removing a civilian government through a coup,
and replacing it with a military government to save the nation
from what it views as the perils of civilian rule.

At times

the military sense of mission may override loyalty to existing
authority.7
The weakness of civilian institutions leads to greater
military

involvement

in

social,

economic

and

political

6Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 217.
7Nordlinger, 19-20.
4

spheres.

This has been termed "reactive militarism," meaning

that the military expands its role as a result of civilian
weakness.8
The extent to which military institutions
and individuals become politicized is a
function of the weakness of civilian
political organizations and the inability
of civilian political leaders to deal
with the principal policy problems facing
the country.9
Many

authors

have noted that the military’s coherence

intervening in politics is often,

if not always,

in

aided by

encouragement from sectors of civil society.10
The above discussion does not imply a lack of internal
conflict within the military institution.

Rather, it presents

the military as possessing a measure of organization, cohesion
and institutionalization enabling it to act decisively at
certain

key

coherence

moments

allows

governance.11

the

in

Latin

military

Existing

American
to

take

differences

polities.
a

based

direct
on

This
role

in

ethnicity,

class, generation and branch of service are often exacerbated
by military rule.

Other conflicts, over power, the spoils of

Morris
Janowitz, The
Military
in
the
Political
Development of New Nations (Chicago:
University of Chicago
Press, 1964), 4-5, 85.
9Huntington, 221.
10Stepan, 128.
11Huntington, 217.
5

office

and

governance.12

ideology,
To

are

more

understand

these

directly
issues,

caused
1 will

by

first

examine the causes of military intervention and the type of
society which is prone to intervention.
Latin
praetorian.
forces,

American

societies

often

been

defined

as

A praetorian society is one in which all social

clergies,

universities,

etc., are politicized.
general

have

political

labor

unions,

militaries,

Social groups become concerned with

issues,

rather

than with

issues relevant to the particular group.

only

specific

In a praetorian

society, the rules of the political game are not agreed upon
by the different players in the political system.

Each group

resorts to whatever methods are at its disposal to influence
the political system, and no recognized methods for conflict
resolution exist.

In such a society, the military uses its

superior force to intervene in politics.

By the threat of

force, the use of force, or direct control of the government,
the military becomes the most influential political actor.13
The following describes conflict in this type of system:

12Jan Knippers Black, Sentinels of the Empire:
States and Latin American Militarism (New York:
Press, 1986), 90-91.
13Huntington, 194-197; and Nordlinger, 2-3*
6

The United
Greenwood

In a praetorian system social forces
confront each other nakedly; no political
institutions, no corps of professional
political
leaders are recognized or
accepted as the legitimate intermediaries
to moderate group conflict.
Equally
important, no agreement exists among the
groups
as
to
the
legitimate
and
authoritative
methods
for
resolving
conflicts.14
Praetorianism
military's

is

a

resort

useful

to

concept

violence

as

in
a

understanding

means

for

the

achieving

political goals.

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS
The military in Latin America may intervene for several
reasons.

Extensive U.S. training in the post World War II era

led to a National

Security Doctrine.

The enemy of these

militaries, as defined by the U.S., was internal rather than
external.15

Latin American militaries sought to prevent the

rise of other social groups or popular movements from gaining
power.16

In the context of the Cold War, the U.S. sought to

strengthen
corporate

the

Right,

and

consciousness.

the

military

Having

gained

developed

a

a

strong

repressive

capability and a sense of competence, the military often felt

14Huntington, 196.
15Black, 40-43.
16Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London;
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15-17: and Huntington
231-233.
7

that it was more capable than civilians to run the country.
During this process, the U.S. often encouraged the political
aspirations of the military as well, through training, aid and
promoting increased self confidence of the armed forces.17
Military intervention is related to the sense of mission
discussed

above,

but

also

participation in a society.
role

during

various

to

the

levels

of

political

The military can play a different

stages

of

political

development.

According to Huntington,
As society changes, so does the role of
the military. In the world of oligarchy,
the soldier is a radical; in the middleclass world he is a participant and
arbiter; as the mass society looms on the
horizon he becomes the conservative
guardian of the existing order.18
In a radical praetorian system, the city (urban areas) becomes
the center of political influence in place of rural areas,
reflecting the gap between the city and the country.

The

instability caused by this shift (from rural to urban) leads
the military to intervene to bring the middle sectors into the
political game.

This entrance of middle class groups into

politics marks the beginning of radical praetorianism.
radical praetorian society,

In a

social groups use the means at

their disposal to try to influence existing authority rather
than to exercise authority.

Once the middle classes become

17Black, 40-42.
18Ibid. , 221.
8

the

established

force

stabilizing role.

in

politics,

the

military

plays

a

Whether or not effective institutions are

formed to deal with mass participation determines the role of
the military in a mass society.19
If

institutions

participation,
professional.

the

are

created

to

military

may

become

deal

with

mass

apolitical

and

But, if this is not the case, the military will

protect the middle class order from the lower classes.

Thus

the military becomes a guardian, and prevents the broadening
of political participation.20
If the army judges that the republic is
in danger, that disorder is in prospect,
it has the obligation to intervene and to
restore the constitution.
Once this is
done, it then has the obligation to
withdraw and to return power to the
normal
(conservative,
middle-class)
civilian leaders.21
In

this

sense,

the

military

exercises

a

veto

over

the

system.22
Huntington's stages of praetor ianism provide a historical
perspective as to the development of praetorian systems.
A.

Nordlinger

intervention

explains

in politics

different

types

of

military

in relation to the goals

19Ibid. , 209-212, 222.
20Ibid. , 222, 224.
21Ibid. , 227.
22Ibid. , 228.
9

Eric

of the

military, which may provide greater insight into patterns of
civil-military relations.

TABLE 1 summarizes the roles and

objectives of the military.

Table 1
The Levels of Military Intervention

Extent of Power

Moderators

Guardians

Rulers

Veto power

Governmental

Regime

control

dominance
Effect political

Political and economic

Preserve

Preserve

objectives

status quo

status quo

change and

and/or correct

sometimes

malpractices and

socioeconomic

deficiencies

change

Source: Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics (Englewood
Cliffs, NY: Prentice Hall, 1977), 22.
Each role brings different levels of military participation.
If the military plays the role of moderator, civilians govern,
but do not exercise effective control.

Direct control of the

government is not needed to achieve the goals of the military
as moderator.
rulers.

Often, moderators will

Guardians

moderators,

pursue

much

the

become guardians or
same

objectives

as

but see direct control of the government for a

short period as the only means.

Rulers have more ambitious

goals, and set out to control the government and dominate the
regime.

Military rulers may only mention a return to civilian

10

government at an unspecified date.23
While the likelihood of moving from a moderator to a
guardian

or ruler role

direction is not.

is discussed,

moving the

opposite

Options for a return to civilian government

are presented, but it would seem possible to move from a more
extreme form of intervention to a milder one.

This would mean

the continuation of a praetorian system, but the possibility
of

improvement

Nordlinger

within

suggests

it.

that

The
this

way

it was

is unlikely.

presented
In my

by

view,

reducing the role of the military in politics seems a much
more likely option than eliminating its role altogether.

This

approach deals mainly with military rationale for intervention
in politics, not necessarily in a post transition setting or
post transfer of the reins of government.

As such, it does

not provide a meaningful way to examine relevant elements of
civil-military

relations

after

a

change

to

civilian

government.

MILITARY WITHDRAWAL
Military rulers often find governance a more difficult
task than they anticipate, and unlike civilians who can choose
politics as a full time vocation, the military serves other
functions,

such

as

defending

its

corporate

preserving the security of the nation.

23Nordlinger, 21-2 6.
11

interest

and

Once in control of the

government, militaries often find that governance does not go
as smoothly as planned.

As rulers, militaries usually prove

no more competent than civilians, and so believing that their
policies

are unlikely

withdrawal
military.

is

used

to

to be reversed
preserve

after

the

a transition,

public

image

of

the

Often the armed forces will take over government

without explicit goals, which can cause conflict within the
institution itself, over policies or the duration of military
rule and proper time for disengagement.24
Military institutions may withdraw from direct governance
for many reasons —
rivalries

created

to preserve military unity threatened by
by

the

duties

of

ruling,

the

general

political-economic climate involving human rights, foreign aid
conditionality,

loan

reviews,

concerns

of

transnational

corporations, the debt crisis, some factions profiting more
from the spoils of office,
conflict

among

branches

ideology, regional conflict, and
of

service.25

Mismanaging

the

economy and increasing corruption, the military often proves
no

more

competent

civilians.
military

to

in

dealing

with

economic

crisis

than

Many of these' issues are seen by some in the
impair

efforts

to

defeat

guerrilla

movements

24Nordlinger, 142-146.
25George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl, "Liberalization and
Redemocratization in Latin America: The Search for Models and
Meanings," in Liberalization and Redemocratization in Latin
America. eds. George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1987), 8; and Black, 90-91.
12

within their societies.

Some factions are concerned only with

the guerrillas, and others with how the crisis in the economy
and extensive repression makes the war situation worse.

Often

these military governments face a decline in international
support as well.26
When

considering

a change

from military

to

civilian

government, the key issue of dissension in the armed forces
between the "hard-liners" and the "soft-liners"
issue of return to civilian government.

rests in the

Hard-liners are more

radical and essentially authoritarian in their politics.

They

would like to structurally reform the political system and
permanently prevent the civilian groups they replaced from
returning

to power.

Soft-liners

are moderate,

limited goals in taking control of the government.

with more
They may

only want to remove a few political leaders and make minor
administrative changes.

The hard-liners maintain that they

can and should perpetuate their rule, often believing that
popular movements and democracy are disorders in society which
they must

remove

or

prevent.

The

soft-liners

may

agree

generally with this point of view, but also see the eventual
need

for

legitimation

through

some

type

of

electoral

process.27
It is important to note that when the military is not

26Aguilera, 27.
270'Donnell and Schmitter, 15-17; and Huntington, 231-232.
13

forcibly removed from power, it will play a crucial role in
shaping the new government.

The military may see a transition

as an effective and efficient option for their own goals at
the time.28

Nordlinger observed that there are several paths

to civilian rule, only one of which appears possible.

The

first would be that the military is forced from office by
extensive

civilian

opposition,

but

civilian

unlikely to be strong enough to do this.

groups

are

The second would be

that officers outside the government overthrow the military
rulers, and then turn the government over to civilians.
seems

unlikely,

though,

relinquish power to
voluntarily

that

such

civilians.

disengage

from

a

countercoup

Lastly,

It

would

the military may

government.

According

to

Nordlinger, this is the most feasible path, although this does
not necessarily lead to civilian rule.

Instead, the military

may play the role of moderator and control the state without
directly

holding

office.29

Basically

this

assessment

of

paths to disengagement seems appropriate, but not helpful in
determining configurations of civil-military relations after
military withdrawal and subsequent effects on governance.
In a mass praetorian system, where the military is the
guardian of existing middle class order, veto coups are used

28Douglas A. Chalmers and Craig H. Robinson, "Why Power
Contenders Choose Liberalization,” International Studies
Quarterly 26 no. 1 (March 1982), 5-7.
29Nordlinger, 139-141.
14

by the armed forces to ensure that the government does not
pursue policies that the military disapproves of.

If the

military intervenes in this way, it has several options.

The

armed forces can retain control of the government and restrict
participation, which may lead to more repression, or retain
control and allow an expansion of participation.

The other

two options would be if the military returned government to
civilians, and either restricted participation of new groups,
or expanded participation of new groups.

A return to civilian

government with an expansion of participation would be ideal
in the sense of a transition; however, this is complicated by
the lack of community and institutions in civil society.

This

traps the society in a state of praetorianism, which leads to
repeated military intervention.

At this juncture, Nordlinger

sees the military as institution builder as possibly the only
chance for escaping the cycle of praetorianism.30
The military may leave office without leaving power.

The

best protection against democracy may be the procedures of
democracy.
military

By allowing elections and some participation, the
may

liberalization.

diffuse

demands

for

greater

military

endorsement

of

and

Attempts by the armed forces to legalize the

system lead to continued military power.
for the

change

a

is to

hold

government.

30Ibid. , 233-240.
15

elections
The

An honorable way out
to

problem

get

democratic

with

such

an

election lies in the methods used by the military to ensure
that certain candidates will be or not be elected.

Through a

"controlled and coercive multiparty system" or a "dominant
military party" the armed forces will continue to control the
government.

". . .legalization often does not have full and

complete democracy as its goal."31
If

the

military

agrees

to withdraw

certain conditions may be set.

from

government,

When retreating from direct

rule, the military will often try to limit civilian authority
over its internal operations, as well as provide immunity for
past

crimes

and

establish

certain

continued military dominance.32

"power

provinces"

for

The armed forces may require

a veto power over candidates for office, or force civilians to
nominate preferred military officers or candidates to high
appointed
military.

offices,
Although

especially
Rouquie

those

does

responsible

not

seem

to

for

the

adequately

describe how civilians might gain control over the military,
he allows for the possibility that military intervention in
politics can become a thing of the past.

"The longer military

intervention does not take place, the more civilian power is
reinforced, military usurpation made more difficult, and the
political

system

demilitarized.1,33

31Rouquie, 351-354, 368.
32Aguilera, 32.
33Rouquie, 364.
16

Civilians

may

have

to

give concessions to move forward, and the military might only
withdraw as a tactical move or to regroup.34
Many aspects of the international system make this wave
of democratization unique..

With the

collapse

of

Eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union, democratic government holds much
prestige in an international context.

Also, this signals the

end of the Cold War, which means that the rationale of the
National

Security

State

needs

to

be

reevaluated.

Since

subversive leftists are no longer the main concern of the
U.S., policies have changed.

The U.S. has placed increasing

importance on democratic government in relations with Latin
America, especially in the disbursement of military aid.
Rouquie notes that the main impetus for democratization
or military withdrawal from politics comes from within the
military

itself,35 while others might assert that pressure

from the United States plays a decisive role.36

The U.S. has

attempted to promote democratic government through foreign
assistance policies.

The amount of influence gained through

economic and military aid is by no means clear.

Examination

of

the

specific

cases

may

provide

insight.

If

policy

objective of the U.S. is a transition from authoritarian rule,

34Ibid. , 359-364, 374-376.
35Ibid. , 370.
36Black, 110-111.
17

does withholding military aid lead to the desired result?
What

is the capacity of Latin American militaries

to act

autonomously in spite of U.S. sanctions?

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE POST TRANSITION PERIOD
The focus of much of the literature on civil-military
relations

centers

on

coups

or

processes

leading

to

intervention in politics, the period of direct military rule,
the decision to disengage from government, or even potential
configurations of civil-military relations.

Less attention is

focused on the period following a transition from military to
civilian

government

and

the

factors

which

lead

to

a

strengthening of civilian control or failure and continued
military dominance.

Alfred Stepan has devised a useful model

to analyze the relationship between civilians and the military
after a transfer from military to civilian government with
attention to areas of potential conflict.37
The two main areas selected to examine the amount of
civilian control are the dimension of articulated military
contestation (against policies of the new government) and the
dimension of military institutional prerogatives.

There are

several areas for potential conflict between the military and
a new civilian government.
of

the

previous

regime

These are the human rights abuses
and

37Stepan, 68.
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how

they

will

be

handled,

democratic government attempts to change the organizational
mission and structure of the military (control the military),
and the military budget,38
Military prerogatives are a bit complex.
For our purposes,
the dimension of
military
institutional
prerogatives
refers to those areas where, whether
challenged or not, the military as an
institution assumes they have an acquired
right or privilege, formal or informal,
to exercise effective control over its
internal governance, to play a role
within extramilitary areas within the
state apparatus, or even to structure
relationships
between the
state and
political or civil society.39
Low levels of prerogatives exist when a civilian government
holds de jure and de facto control over an issue area.
military

is

denied

noncompliance,

then

considered moderate.
when the military
control

and

autonomous.

de

jure

control,

the

military

prerogative

engages

in

would

be

An area where this may be visible is

is constitutionally

authority,
Other

but

If the

but de

facto

prerogative

subject to civilian
the military

areas

are:

remains
Military

relationship to the chief executive (Who has de jure and de
facto control?) , and the role of the military
positions,

intelligence, military promotions,

in Cabinet

and the legal

system (Are military officers generally subject to civil laws

38Ibid.
39Ibid. , 93.
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and courts or military justice?).40
These

prerogatives

contestation.
contested

are

closely

related

to

military

Potentially every prerogative area could be

by

the

military.

Contestation

involves

articulated conflict with civilian authorities.

open

This would

indicate that the relevant civilian and military actors are
aware of the conflict over policies.
does

not

necessarily

particular area.
relationships

imply

a

of

prerogative

By comparing the levels of both,

are possible.

control results.

lack

Lack of contestation

When

both

are

low,

in

a

several
civilian

If the two dimensions are plotted against

each other, this would be the area in the lower left corner
(see TABLE 2) .

Intense conflict between the military and

civilians where contestation and prerogatives are high would
be a nearly
(upper

right

impossible
on

position

chart).

The

for civilians
upper

left

to

sustain

position

analytically possible is unlikely in reality.

while

It would not

make sense in a situation of de jure and de facto civilian
control

for

the

military

to

contestation.41

40Ibid. , 93-97.
41Ibid. , 68, 98-102.
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engage

in

high

levels

of

TABLE 2
CONTESTATION, PREROGATIVES, AND C I V I L MILITARY RELATIONS
33

Unsustainable
p o s i t i o n t or
military

0

Near untenable!
p o s i t i o n for :
democratic ;

leaders

5

civilian

2

control

leaders ;

Unequal civ ilian ;
accomodation <

LOW

MILITARY

PREROGATIVES

HIGH

Source: Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil
and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1988), 100.
The relationship of unequal civilian accommodation (lower
right)

is

perhaps

the

possibility for change.

most

accommodation

considering

the

This model is dynamic and subject to

shifts of any magnitude;
civilian

interesting,

therefore,
could
21

be

a position of unequal
consolidated

into

a

democratic system.

This relationship may be extremely useful

in analyzing Guatemala and prospects for democracy since the
transition in 1986*

Some aspects of this position appear

relevant to Guatemala:
Another vulnerability of the 'unequal
civilian accommodation' position is that
a polity could become transformed into a
nondemocratic civilian-headed garrison
state because of exploitation by the
executive of the prerogatives of the
military retained in the system.
An
additional
basic
weakness
of
this
position is that the lack of regime
autonomy from the military implied in
such high military prerogatives could
delegitimize the new democracy in the
eyes
of
civil
and
even
political
society*42
Stepan's model,
concrete

areas

for

unlike the other approaches,
examination

military relations.

in

post

provides

transition

civil-

In my opinion, civil-military relations

is the most crucial issue in discussing democratic governance
in

Latin

American

states

that

authoritarian rule in the past.
applied

to

South

America.

have

experienced

military

Previously, this model was

Guatemala

provides

a

unique

opportunity to broaden the range of countries analyzed to
Central America.
in

Guatemala

government

in

Military rule ran practically uninterrupted

for

thirty

1986.

years

Thus,

prior

to

the

civil-military

transfer

relations

of
are

crucial to understanding prospects for democratic governance

42Ibid., 101.
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in the future.
Guatemala today, although nominally headed by civilian
government, remains likely the most repressive military regime
in the Western hemisphere.

This Central American nation,

controlled by the military, was allowed to undergo relatively
free elections in 1985, and witnessed the installation of a
civilian president in 1986.
rule

experienced

revolutionary
entrenched,

by

period

The last interlude of civilian

Guatemala

from

occurred

1944-1954.

institutionalized military

So

during
why

of the

the

would
early

the

1980s

allow this apparent transition and what are the prospects for
a democratic consolidation of civilian rule?

The period from

1986-1990 represents the first completed term in office for a
civilian president after the military turned over the official
reins of government.

Even though the term was completed and

a peaceful transfer of power occurred in 1991, the extent of
transition was not clear.
but

not

the

democratic
relations.

only,

In my view, the most significant,

dimension

governance

is

the

to

gauge

nature

progress
of

towards

civil-military

Thus, the principal question to seek to answer is:

How have civil-military relations determined the extent and
nature of transition towards democracy in Guatemala from 19861990?
Using Guatemala as a case study of a recent change from
military to civilian government it will be possible to apply

23

Stepan's model of civil-military relations in a transition
from

authoritarian

rule.

The

analysis

will

be

based

on

information collected from primary and secondary sources as
well as personal interviews by the author*
this thesis has several objectives.

The remainder of

First, a review of the

historical context in Guatemala will aid in a discussion of
prerogatives and contestation in the period after military
withdrawal.
military
government
research,

Secondly, the degree of U.S. influence through

aid

in

will

affecting
be

the

examined.

conclusions,

installation
Lastly,

a

of

summary

civilian
of

the

and an assessment of the nature of

civil-military relations in Guatemala will lead to a final
expectation of this thesis which is to test the validity of
Stepan's model.

Considering that the model was developed to

examine Brazil and the Southern Cone, this case study should
provide a very useful gauge of the method in a comparative
setting.
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CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Guatemala
located

is the

largest country

just south of Mexico,

Honduras and El Salvador.

and

in Central America,

is bordered by Belize,

Much of the population is of Mayan

descent, although only about one-third is identified as Indian
now.

The other two thirds can be termed Ladino, which may

indicate

Spanish-Mayan

descent,

but

more

importantly

identifies those who have adopted Western dress and lifestyle.
The Maya of the rural highlands are still for the most part
excluded from politics.
poor and marginalized.

The majority of the population is
Racial and class tensions are strong,

with Indian used as a derogatory term.1

Control of these

Indian masses in the countryside is important in understanding
Guatemalan politics.
Politics in Guatemala from the time of independence from
Spain have

been

violent means.

controlled

by

small

groups

often

through

Even when the formal trappings of democracy

have been in place, it has been in name only.

A brief history

1For a more complete discussion see Peter Calvert,
Guatemala:
A Nation in Turmoil (Boulder:
Westview Press,
1985).
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will

be

useful

afterwards.
dominated

to

set

the

stage

for

the

transition

and

The political arena in Guatemala until 1944 was

by

personalistic

leaders.

From

1898-1920,

the

country was controlled by Manuel Estrada Cabrera, who relied
on a few individuals rather than a military institution to
perpetuate his rule.
U.S.

Later, General Jorge Ubico ruled with

State Department backing from 1931-1944.

Neither of

these caudillos, although they employed repression, depended
on the military as an institution to sustain their regimes.
In

spite

of

this,

significant way.

Ubico
He

militarized

extended military

the

society

operations

in

a

in the

countryside, making the armed forces dominant in this area.
This transformation remains essential in explaining military
prerogatives until the present time.2
The two successive administrations of Juan Jose Arevalo
and Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (1944-1954) represent the last period
of legitimate,
until 1986*

elected presidential government in Guatemala

The "Revolution" from 1944-1954 began when Ubico

was ousted due to popular unrest.

When his successor, the

head of a junta, indicated that he wanted to pursue a similar
style personal dictatorship, younger officers moved against
the ruling junta.
1950)

faced

more

The elected government of Arevalo (1944than

thirty

coup

attempts,

but

2Jim Handy, "Resurgent Democracy and the
Military," Journal of Latin American Studies
(November 1986): 386-387.
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was

not

Guatemalan
18 no. 2

toppled because the bulk of the military did not support the
coups*

Captain Jacobo Arbenz, one of the leaders of the

revolt in 1944, became President of Guatemala in 1950.

Arbenz

enjoyed some military support, and although the armed forces
did not always approve, he pursued reforms, most importantly
agrarian reform.3
TABLE 3
GUATEMALAN LEADERS 1931-1991
1931-1944

General Jorge Ubico

1944-1950

Juan Jose Arevalo

1950-1954

Captain Jacobo Arbenz Guzm&n

1954-1957

Castillo Armas-Liberation leader

1958-1963

General Miguel Ydlgoras Fuentes

1963-1966

Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia

1966-1970

ar Mendez Montenegro

1970-1974

Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio

1974-1978

General K

1978-1982

General Romeo Lucas Garcia

1982-1983

General Efraln Rios Montt

1983-1986

General M

1986-1991

Vinicio Cerezo

1991-?

Jorge Serrano

iigerud

Victores

DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WAR
In 1954, the United States' Central Intelligence Agency

3Ibid., 388-390.
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aided and promoted an overthrow of Arbenz's government on the
grounds that it was Communist.
mistake

was

Communists.4

to
It

institute
is

influencing the U.S.

Though not a Communist, his

land

reform

argued that

one

of

supported
the

main

by

the

factors

decision was an attempt to apply the

agrarian reform to lands owned by the United Fruit Company.
Consequently, the U. S. organized a Liberation army of exiles
and mercenaries in Honduras,

as well as fostering internal

opposition.5
A

significant

aspect

of the

overthrow of the Arbenz

government is the military's refusal to defend the country
against the invasion of the Liberation forces.
encouraged peasant

organization

in rural

areas,

Arbenz had
and as

a

result, the military was losing influence in the countryside.6
This prerogative, to dominate the countryside, as mentioned
above, plays a crucial role in the part the military takes in
politics.
The 1954 coup led to the formation of guerrilla groups,

4Jim
Handy,
"
'The Most
Precious
Fruit
of the
Revolution1:
The Guatemalan Agrarian Reform, 1952-54,"
Hispanic American Historical Review 68 no. 4 (November 1988):
700; Allan Nairn and Jean-Marie Simon, "Bureaucracy of Death,"
The New Republic (30 June 1986); 15.
5Handy, "Resurgent Democracy," 390.
6Ibid. , 391.
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both Communist and not.7

The Guatemalan military then used

lists from different groups which supported Arbenz to classify
70,000 people as Communists, employing these records to begin
the

counterinsurgency

war

that

continues

today,

and

establishing a prerogative in the area of counterinsurgency.
Instead of focusing on eradicating Communist guerrillas, the
military expanded operations to target anyone suspected of
being

a guerrilla,

of being a potential

supporting guerrillas.8

guerrilla,

or of

Basically, the counterinsurgency of

the Guatemalan military proceeded in several stages
a
purgative
anti-communist
transitional
era,
1954-66;
a
constitutional era, 1966-82, which relied
on institutionalized state terrorism; and
an even more brutal era of direct
extra-constitutional military rule, March
1982-January 1986.9
The

violence

in

Guatemala

ranged

from

periods

of

indiscriminate use of widespread murder of entire communities

7Alfonso Yurrita,
"The Transition from Military to
Civilian Rule in Guatemala," in The Military and Democracy:
The Future of civil-Military Relations in Latin America, eds.
Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S. R. Mendelson and Juan Rial
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 77; John A. Booth and
Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1989) , 39; and Penny Lernoux, "Guatemala's New
Military Order," The Nation. 28 November 1988, 557.
8Gordon L. Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization by Way of
Democratization
in
Guatemala,"
in
Liberalization
and
Redemocratization in Latin America, eds. George A. Lopez and
Michael Stohl (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 37-38, 40;
and Nairn and Simon, 15.
9Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization," 40.
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to more discriminate killings.10
The guerrilla groups which formed after the coup in 1954
wanted to reclaim the unfinished revolution of the previous
decade.

As the guerrillas evolved and eventually unified into

the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), their
ideology was essentially Marxist, acknowledging the need for
revolutionary

conflict.11

revolutionary,

popular,

The

desired

democratic

establishment

government

had

of

a

several

objectives:
(1)
guarantee
the
elimination
of
repression; (2) guarantee the provision
of the basic needs of the majority of the
people by eliminating the political
domination of the repressive rich, both
national and foreign, who rule Guatemala;
(3) guarantee equality between Indians
and ladinos; (4) guarantee the creation
of
a
"New
Society"
in
which
all
patriotic,
popular,
and
democratic
sectors will be represented; and (5)
guarantee a policy of nonalignment and
international cooperation.12
Throughout

the

stages

of

counterinsurgency,

the

Guatemalan military has developed an institutional capacity to
conduct counterinsurgency and established a National Security

10Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala," in Latin American and
Caribbean Contemporary Record vol. 7, eds. James M. Malloy and
Eduardo Gamarra (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990), B265.
11Caesar D. Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala,"
in
Latin
American
Insurgencies, ed.
Georges
Fauriol
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 1985), 109-111.
12Ibid., 111.
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State.
protect

Destroying the guerrillas in an effort to defend and
the

mission.13

nation

became

the

essence

of

the

military's

After the coup in 1954, the Guatemalan military

was not well equipped to deal with a guerrilla threat.

Having

just aided in the overthrow of a "communist” government, the
U.S. proceeded to assist the Guatemalan military in enhancing
its

counterinsurgency

skills.14

In

the

early

1960s,

the

military pursued a type of civic action program in addition to
the use of violence*

The U.S. supplied aid and advisors to

implement this program of "winning the hearts and minds'1 of
the

population.

Much

of this

assistance

came

under

the

Alliance for Progress as the U.S. helped shape the Guatemalan
military's counterinsurgency tactics.15
With the election of Julio Mendez Montenegro in 1966, a
civilian President forced to allow the military a free reign
in counterinsurgency, the tactics turned more towards violence
and repression.

From this period until 1982, with differing,

but always high,

levels of terror and murder, the military

13Ibid. , 105.
14Howard Sharckman, "The Vietnamization of Guatemala:
U.S. Counterinsurgency Programs," in Guatemala, eds. Susanne
Jonas and David Tobis (Berkeley: North American Congress on
Latin America, 1974), 193-194.
15Sharckman, 194; and Yurrita, 79.
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attempted to destroy the guerrillas once and for all,16
As
the
Guatemalan
counterinsurgency
evolved and escalated, its focus shifted
from "winning hearts and minds"
to
controlling
the
behavior
of
the
population through outright terror; thus,
an
essentially
localized
offensive
evolved into a system of totalitarian
control.17
Some debate exists as to the extent of U.S. involvement
in the

Guatemalan

counterinsurgency campaigns.

That

the

relationship was close seems certain; for example, the U.S.
trained Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion in bases in
Guatemala.18 Although the association was close, officially,
United States* military personnel served in advisory roles
only.19

According

to

retired

U.S. General

Frederick

F.

Woerner, who served in Guatemala from 1966-1969, U.S. forces
were

never

used

directly

in

combat.20

Even

though

U.S.

forces may not have been directly involved, the U.S. was able
to influence the development of counterinsurgency in Guatemala

16Eugene K. Keefe, "National Security," in Guatemala:.. A
Country Study, ed. Richard F. Nyrop (Washington:
U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1983), 186; Sharckman, 195, 202203.
17Sharckman, 193.
18Keef e, 186.
19Sharckman, 198-199.
20General Frederick F. Woerner, phone interview by author,
20 September 1991.
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through aid, training, advisement and military hardware.21
Rios Montt, a presidential candidate and General in 1974,
assumed control of the government in 1982.

His association

with the military had been weak since 1974, while he pursued
activities in a fundamentalist Protestant church.

His ties

with the Christian Democratic party did not prevent the fervor
of counterinsurgency pursued during his government.

This

phase of counterinsurgency involved procedures to permanently
alter

the

peasants
through

organization
into

the

model

use

of

of

the

villages,
civic

countryside.
civil

action

By

defense

programs

forcing

patrols

involving

and
food

distribution and re-education, the military aimed at complete
control.22

A degree of success was achieved,

putting the

military in a stable position, which facilitated the transfer
from military to civilian government in 1986.
Rios

Montt

was

overthrown

in

1983

officers led by General Mejia Victores.

and

replaced

by

General Mejia began

to reinforce army discipline and prepared for elections in
1985.23

Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo,

a Christian Democrat,

won

the elections in a run-off with 68.4 percent of the votes.

21Sharckman, 19 6.
22Handy,
"Resurgent Democracy," 402-403;
Guatemala:
A Country Guide (Albuquerque:
Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1989),
Sereseres, "Highlands War," 113-115.
23Handy, "Resurgent Democracy," 405.
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Tom Barry,
The Inter41-42; and

His party's strong showing reflected the divided nature of the
opposition, and was tempered by promises to avoid major land
reform and prosecution of officers for human rights abuses in
order

to

placate

elections,

"The

the

military.24

army was

in

At

a more

the

time

powerful

of

the

position

in

relation to the other political actors in Guatemala than it
had ever been."25
Along with violence from the military institution, the
armed

forces

and private right-wing groups worked through

death squads.

Much of this activity was supported directly by

the military,

but private groups such as the Secret Anti

communist Army

(ESA) , the White Hand and Jaguar of Justice

(JJ) have also taken credit for murders.
lessened

at

throughout

the

the

beginning

rest

of his

of

Death squad activity

Cerezo's

administration

term,

but

rose

(as with human

rights violations overall, to be discussed below),26
By 1985, the Guatemalan military considered itself to be
in control of the country, having massacred tens of thousands
of peasants
organization.

and having destroyed much

of the guerrillas'

The military held supremacy at this point as a

result of scorched

earth policies, relocation of peasants in

24Richard Millett, "Guatemala,11 in Latin American. and
Caribbean Contemporary Record, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (New
York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), B299.
25Handy, "Resurgent Democracy," 403-405, 408.
26Barry, 51-52.
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model villages

(concentration camps), and the creation of

Civil

Patrols.27

Defense

But,

by

1988,

the

guerrilla

movement seemed to have revived somewhat, despite denials from
the army.
the

Military deaths were up from the previous year, and

counter insurgency war

escalated.

The

army will

only

accept complete surrender on the part of the guerrillas, and
the guerrillas will not give in.28

ECONOMIC DECLINE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
In light of Guatemala's deteriorating economic situation,
the corruption and human rights abuses did not bode well for
the military.

Military government remained unable to provide

solutions to economic crisis or to stop the decline.
prices

in

the

early

to

mid-eighties

for

agricultural exports added to the debt problem,
public sector

(military)

borrowing.29

Low

Guatemala's
caused by

The rising debt was

not arrested until 1988, and the amount required to service
the debt climbed as well

(see TABLE 4).

Guatemala's Gross

27Robert H. Trudeau, "The Guatemalan Election of 1985:
Prospects for Democracy,1' in Elections and Democracy in
Central America, eds. John A Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 99;
and Lernoux, 556, 558.
28Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B269; and Barry, 37-39,
56-57.
29Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization," 46-47; James
Painter, "Guatemala in Civilian Garb," Third World Quarterly
8 no. 3 (July 1986): 827.
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Domestic
1986,

Product

more

declined

than half

during

this

of Guatemala's

period

export

Guatemala

faced

other

economic

woes,

By

earnings were

required to make payments on the national debt.
this

also.30

a

Along with
decline

in

tourism, increasing unemployment, and a falling currency, the
quetzal.31
TABLE 4
SELECTED ECONOMIC DATA FOR GUATEMALA
Total
GDP
(growth
rates)

Total external
disbursed debt
(millions of
dollars)

Debt service
paid
(long-term)
(millions of
dollars)

1980

3.7

1165.8

137.2

1981

0.7

1264.2

128.1

1982

-3.5

1537.3

135.4

1983

-2.6

1799.4

177.5

1984

0.5

2343.0

256.9

1985

-0.6

2616.9

268.3

1986

0.1

2755.2

293.9

1987

3.5

2816.2

303.2

1988

3.7

2632.5

358.8

1989
estimate

4.0

2665.0

378.0

Progress in Latin America 1990 Report
Hopkins University Press, 1990), 114.

(Baltimore;

Johns

30Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social,
Progress in Latin America 1990 Report (Baltimore;
Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990), 114.
31Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization,11 46-47.
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Economic decline added to the opposition of traditional
economic elites to the military regime.
sector

in

Guatemala

American neighbors.

was

more

The business elite

powerful

than

its

The Chamber of Agriculture,

Central

Commerce,

Industry and Finance (CACIF) represented business interests
conflicting with military governments.

The break between the

dominant economic class and the military was indicative of the
economic

elites

desire

to

participate

directly

in

government and lessen the autonomy of the military.
split

led

to

transition*32

pressures
Military

entrepreneurs

and

owners

by

traditional

expansion
(see

into

below

the

THE

the
This

elites

for

economy

MILITARY

AS

as
AN

ECONOMIC PLAYER) was seen as threatening to the interests of
traditional

economic

elites,

because

military

enterprises

competed with those of the traditional elites.
Not

only

could

the

resolving economic crisis,

military

not

produce

results

in

the political violence stemming

from the counterinsurgency war greatly contributed to, or even
caused

many

of

Guatemala's

economic

problems*33

The

repression and violence of the military created a "wandering

32Eduardo Gamarra and A. Douglas Kincaid, "Democratization
in Latin America:
A Comparative Analysis of Bolivia and
Guatemala," Paper presented to the annual meeting of the
Southern Political
Science Association
(Charlotte,
NC:
November 5-7, 1987), 26-27, 29.
33Richard Millett, "Guatemala: Progress and Paralysis,"
Current History (March 1985): 111-112.
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and

dislocated

rural

labor

force,"

disruptive guerrilla force.34
resulted

from

the

and

an

increasingly

A drop in the tourist trade

extreme

political

violence.35

Most

significant is the interrelation of international isolation
and economic collapse as a result of the military's human
rights abuses and mismanagement of the economy.

THE MILITARY PRODUCES INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION
From

1954

to

1986,

military

regimes

in

Guatemala,

including one term with a civilian President, have searched
for

stability

and

security.

A

constant

struggle

with

guerrilla insurgents, and the problems this created within the
military

itself

(See

section

DIVISIONS

IN THE MILITARY),

helped to produce coups and instability, further exacerbating
economic

problems.36

National

elections

and

transfer

of

government to civilians in many ways are an extension of the

34Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization," 46.
35Millett, "Progress and Paralysis," 111.
36For further discussion of Guatemala's post-1954 military
governments see: George Black, Garrison Guatemala (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1984); Handy, "Resurgent Democracy,"
383-408; Gordon L. Bowen, "Guatemala:
The Origins and
Development
of
State
Terrorism,"
in
Revolut ion
and
Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, eds.
Donald Schultz and Douglas Graham (Boulder, CO:
Westview
Press, 1984), 269-300; and Congress, House, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,
United States Policy Toward Guatemala, prepared statement of
Caesar D. Sereseres, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, Committee
Print, 25-59.
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search for stability.

The transition was seen by some in the

military as a long term project for future security.37

The

isolation internationally is one element of the instability
faced by the military prior to 1986.
The

reasons

for

a

nominal

"transition” to

civilian

government had become clear.
A democratically elected administration
was seen by the army as a necessary
condition for new and expanded flows of
foreign investment and bilateral and
multilateral economic aid, which were
regarded as the best way out of the
economic decline and the
increasing
social polarisation, which, if it were
not at least halted, could only benefit
the left in the long term.38
According to Millett, to obtain significant foreign economic
aid,

desperately

needed

in

light

of

Guatemala's

economic

decline, the military must at least let there appear to exist
elected civilian rule.39

ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY AID
The nose dive in Guatemala's economy necessitated large
amounts of resources from outside to even begin to improve,
but military economic policy and counterinsurgency tactics
almost completely isolated Guatemala internationally.

The

37Barry, 43-44.
38Painter, "Civilian Garb," 819.
39Richard Millett, "After the Elections," TheNewReBUblic
(24 February 1986): 18.
39

state terrorism practiced by the military created isolation
between

Guatemala

and

significantly the U.S.

the

international

community,

Loans and international aid became

increasingly vital, but unavailable to the military regime.
Human rights abuses had led to the termination of U.S. police
aid in 1975 and, finally, U.S. military aid in 1977.40

The

impact of the cut off of U.S. military aid on the Guatemalan
military is unclear.
when

Guatemala

Military aid was not resumed until 1985

received

$.5

million

in

U.S.

dollars

in

assistance, with increases to $5.4 million in 1986 and $5.5
million in 1987 (see TABLE 5) .

The resumption of aid began

after elections were held for a constituent assembly to draft
a new constitution and prepare for the scheduled elections in
1985.41
In spite of this, some military aid from the U.S. appears
to have

been

supplied

secretly during

the

sanctions,

military goods were sent from Israel as well.42
surrogate,

Israel supplied military hardware,

and

Used as a

advisors and

training to benefit itself (profits from sales) as much as the

40Allan
Nairn,
"The
Guatemalan
Progressive (May 1986): 20-22.

Connection,"

The

41Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B262; and James W. Wilkie
and Enrique Ochoa, eds., Statistical Abstract of Latin America
vol.
27
(Los
Angeles:
UCLA
Latin
American
Center
Publications, University of California, 1989), 770.
42Nairn, 20-22.
40

TABLE 5
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO GUATEMALA
MILITARY
TOTAL
TOTAL
AID IN US ECONOMIC
ECONOMIC AND
AID IN US MILITARY AID
$
MILLIONS
$ MILLIONS IN US $
MILLIONS
1966
1.4
9.0
10.4
1967
2.1
14.1
16.2
1968
1.0
16.5
17.5
1969
2.3
9.1
11.4
1970
1.3
32 .2
33.5
1971
6.1
16.7
22.8
1972
1.8
16. 6
18.4
1973
3.7
15.6
11.9
1974
6.1
1.4
4,7
1975
2 .9
14.1
17.0
1976
2.1
45.6
43.5
1977
0.5
20.8
21.3
*
1978
10.6
10. 6
*
1979
24.7
24.7
1980
13.0
13 .0
19.0
1981
19.0
15.5
1982
15.5
29.7
1983
29 .7
20.3
20.3
1984
r"
106,9
1985
0.5
T lTTI
116.7
1986
5.4
5
187.8
1987
5.5
141.6
132.2
9.4
1988
156.6
147.2
1989
9.4
Source: Agency for International Development, Statistics and
Reports Division,
U.S.
Overseas Loans and Grants and
Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, D.C.,
1975), 46; Agency for International Development, Office of
Program and Information Analysis Services, Bureau for Program
Policy Coordination, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, and
Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, D.C.,
1978), 50; Agency for International Development, Office of
Planning and Budgeting,
Bureau for Program and Policy
Coordination, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and .Assistance
from International Organizations (Washington, D.C., 1980), 50;
Agency for International Development, Office of Planning and
Budgeting, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, ILJEL.
Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from^^jrteraationaT
YEARS
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Organizations
(Washington, D.C., 1982),
48; Agency for
International Development, Office of Planning and Budgeting,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, U.S. Overseas
Loans
and
Grants
and
Assistance
from International
Organizations (Washington, D.C., 1987), 51; and Agency for
International Development, Office of Planning and Budgeting,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, U.S. Overseas
Loans___a.nd_ Grants
and
Assistance
from International
Organizations (Washington, D.C., 1990), 51.
U.S.43

Commercial

sales to the Guatemalan government and

private businesses were allowed to continue during this
period,

although they declined.44

Officially anyway,

from

the U.S. point of view, the Contras in Nicaragua seemed more
worthy

of

military,

support

than

the

extremely

violent

Guatemalan

pushed to the background by the anti-Sandinista

campaign.45

The U.S. was concerned that the Soviets would

exert influence in Central America after gaining a foothold in
Nicaragua.

Policy was often designed to limit the possibility

of other guerrilla movements

following the example of the

Sandinistas.46
Policy goals of U.S. military assistance in Guatemala

43Cheryl A. Rubenberg, "The United States, Israel, and
Guatemala:
Interests and Conflicts," in Centra1 Alterlea and
the Middle East: The Internationalization of the Crisis, ed.
Damian J. Fernandez (Miami: Florida International University
Press, 1990), 97, 108; and Victor Perera, "Uzi Diplomacy,"
Mother Jones (July 1985): 40, 43.
44General Accounting Office, Military Sales:__ The__United
States Continuing Munition Supply Relationship__With_Guatemala
GAO/NSIAD-86-31 (January 1986), 4, 8.
45Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization," 45.
46Sereseres, "Highlands War," 102-103.
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have included democracy, economic stabilization,
defeat of the leftist insurgency.
its

independence

from

the

equity and

Guatemala has demonstrated

U.S.

in

this

regard*

The

termination of U.S. military assistance in 1977 was a mutual
decision.
rights

Guatemala had rejected the aid because of human

conditions

that

were

country's internal affairs.47

seen

as

interfering

in

the

This raises significant doubt

as to the effectiveness of aid in promoting democracy.

Some

argue that military aid was needed by Cerezo to pacify hard
liners

in

the military,

while

others

would

say

that the

military will never truly give power to civilians when they
are rewarded with military aid for a facade democracy.48

MILITARY MISSION AND STRUCTURE
The military in Guatemala holds a substantial degree of
autonomy which has developed over time.
composed of the army,
dominant.

The armed forces are

navy and air force,

but the army is

Top level army decisions in general represent the

view of the military as a whole.

Recruits are generally the

rural poor and forced to serve, while officers are from the

47Jonathan
E.
Sanford,
"Guatemala:
U.S.
Assistance Facts," Congressional Research Service,
1987, 3, 5.

Foreign
11 June

48Caleb Rossiter and Bonnie Tenneriello,
"Can U.S.
Military Aid Really Help a Civilian President?" Christian
Science Monitor. 9 June 1988, 13; and Sanford, "Foreign
Assistance," 9-10.
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middle class.

The military has traditionally assigned itself

not only the role of security, but that of saving the nation
as well, so that the responsibility felt by the armed forces
extends beyond eradicating communists
national

affairs.

According

into all sectors of

to the military,

helping to

orient the population towards a positive attitude about a
democratic system, neutralizing the guerrilla threat, gaining
popular

support

collecting

in the

information

fight
for

against the guerrillas,

intelligence

that

may

and

prevent

potential domestic conflict are all appropriate functions.49
The autonomy of the military from domestic elites has grown
along with its economic power, which means that the military
institution facing the new civilian president had definite
prerogatives and an entrenched power base to control them*50
When Vinicio Cerezo took office in 1986 hopes were high
that

a new

era

of

civilian

control

had

begun.

The

new

constitution described the nature of the military role like
this,

"Es unico e indivisible,

esencialmente professional,

apolitico, obediente y no deliberante.I|51

("It is unique and

indivisible, essentially professional, apolitical, obedient,
and does not deliberate.")

In the beginning of his term,

49Ejercito de Guatemala, Direccion de Asuntos Civiles,
Conceptos doctrinarios de asuntos civiles, May 1988, 12, 15,
1R «
lu
50Barry, 39-44.
51Ejercito de Guatemala, 28.
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Cerezo appeared to have a limited amount of influence with the
military.

Cerezo installed moderate officers to positions of

importance within the military, notably the office of Defense
Minister.52

This Minister holds a great deal of power in the

government and over the military institution as well.53

The

support of the officer in this post is essential to a civilian
president, without it controlling the armed forces would be
difficult to impossible.
Hernandez

Mendez

Minister,

preventing

Rodolfo

Lobos,

was

In a significant step, General Jaime
appointed

the

forced

army's

into

to

the

chief

retirement

post

of

Defense

of

staff,

General

and

known

for

his

terrible human rights reputation, from assuming the post.54
Although

Hernandez

was

an

old

line

officer,

Cerezo

appointed General Hector Gramajo to the number two post, chief
of staff.55
retirement

General Hernandez was scheduled for mandatory
soon thereafter,

setting the stage

for General

Hector Gramajo, the new chief of staff, to succeed Hernandez
upon his retirement.
officers

in

the

Grama jo was one of the most moderate

Guatemalan

military,

and

supportive of the new constitutional system.

was

seen

as

This all took

52Sam Dillon, "Guatemala's Cerezo Wins Battle With Army,"
Miami Herald. 10 January 1986, in Information Service of Latin
America, hereafter cited as ISLA.
53Keef e, 194.
54Dillon, "Guatemala's Cerezo."
55Richard Millett, "Guatemala," B302.
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place quietly, and it seemed that Cerezo had won an initial
victory over the armed forces.56
Open conflict with the military was rare, but rumors of
coup

attempts

tensions.57

were

not

uncommon,

revealing

underlying

A more obvious manifestation was the removal of

the civilian chief of police Cerezo appointed early in his
term, and his replacement by a colonel.

Military pressure

seems to have been the cause for the change,

although the

public excuse was that the civilian could not cut down on
street crime*58
January

31,

But,

1987,

as planned,

and General

Hernandez was retired on

Gramajo

became the

Defense

Minister.59
Dissent within the military was responsible
attempts in 1988 and 1989

for coup

(to be discussed further below) .

They were possibly aimed as much at Defense Minister Gramajo
as at President

Cerezo,

because Gramajo was

moderate than some in the military would like.

seen as more
The harder

line military officers saw Gramajo's relationship with Cerezo
as too close.

At the time, Grama jo was able to easily put

56Dillon, "Guatemala's Cerezo."
57Millett, "Guatemala," B302-B303.
58Williams, "Guatemalan's 'Honeymoon'."
59Millett, "Guatemala," B303.
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down the coup attempts, but the tensions ran deep.60
The splits in the military were not over whether they
should control society, but what methods were to be used.

By

late 1989, after the two coup attempts, the hard line seemed
to be gaining control, favoring repression as a response to
popular groups,61

In May 1990, Gramajo retired, and General

Juan Leonel Bolanos (hard line) was named Defense Minister.
General Juan Jose Marroquln was named chief of staff,
General Roberto Matta became deputy chief of staff.

and

There was

some resistance to the appointments, but they proceeded.

The

military seemed to have consolidated a hard line position, and
Guatemala experienced a surge of violence.62
Very soon, though, General Marroquln retired, and General
Matta moved up to the chief of staff position, likely to be
the next Defense Minister.
faction

of

moderates

the military,

Matta was linked to Gramajo's
and

so there was hope

that the

still had influence within the military.

Until

another shift, though, the military was leaning towards a hard

60Lee Hockstader, "Guatemala Puts Down Coup Attempt,"
Washington Post. 10 May 1989, in ISLA.
61Robert H. Trudeau, "Guatemala" in Latin American. and
Caribbean Contemporary Record vol. 8 eds. James M. Malloy and
Eduardo Gamarra (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1991), B252.
62Robert H. Trudeau, "Guatemala," to appear in Latin
American and Caribbean Contemporary Record vol. 9 eds. James
M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra (New York;
Holmes and Meier,
1992) .
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line.

The

changes

in military

office

seem

to

reflect

shifts within the military itself, rather than the amount of
civilian control, although both are a part of the dynamic.
The prerogatives of the military are a little difficult
to identify in this scenario.

Although Cerezo appeared to

have some influence in the beginning, over time this became
secondary to the internal workings of the military itself.

In

the

of

beginning,

the

army

seemed

to

have

lower

levels

prerogatives with regard to military appointments than in the
second half of Cerezo's term, but this may only reflect the
interplay of the factions within the armed forces.

THE MILITARY AS AN ECONOMIC PLAYER
The military not only holds control of Guatemala through
physical
well.

force,

but represents a major economic player as

In addition to personal enrichment through corruption,

military officers became entrepreneurs.

This enabled them to

diversify into many sectors of the economy, such as hotels,
housing projects, the cement industry, cattle ranching, rubber
production, the national airline, telecommunications and other
industrial

and

commercial

enterprises.64

Most

notable,

63Ibid.
^Trudeau,
"Guatemalan Election,"
96-97;
and James
Painter, Guatemala:
False Hope. False Freedom (London:
Catholic Institute for International Relations/Latin American
Bureau Limited, 1987), 47-50.
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perhaps, are the army's bank, El Banco del Ejercito, and the
acquisition of vast tracts of land in the Northern Transversal
Strip

(FTN)

Military

for

livestock,

control over

state enterprises

enriching themselves.
which

in

Military

turn

and

forestry.65

aided officers

in

Public money funded the army's bank,

funded

leaders

agriculture

have

the

enterprises

also

been

of

the

officers.

accused

of

enriching

themselves through arms trading*66
Another area where the military is possibly involved in
corruption

is

drug

trafficking.67

In

the

late

1980s,

Guatemala became the major transhipment point for Colombian
cocaine, as well as a leading producer of opium poppies, which
are processed into heroin, 'mainly in Mexico.68
also a large producer of marijuana.69

Guatemala is

In its 1990 report,

the International Narcotics Control Board expressed concern

65Painter, False Hope, 47-50; Trudeau,
"Guatemalan
Election," 97; and James Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A
Political History of Modern Central America (London: Verso,
1988), 466-467.
66Trudeau, "Guatemalan Election," 97; Painter, False Hope,
47-50; and Barry, 41.
67CERIGUA, "'War on Drugs in Guatemala" vol. 4 (September
1990), 2, 9.
“ CERIGUA, "War on Drugs," 3; CSUCAPAX, "Criticas por
ausencia de Guatemala en la cumbre americana," Centroamerica
Hov No. 30 (5 November 1989), 17; and Lindsey Gruson, "U.S.
Pinning Hopes on Guatemalan Army for Stability and for War
Against Drugs," New York Times, 5 July 1990, in ISLA.
69"Guerra al narcotrafico," Cronica. 8 December 1988, 2324; and "En la mira de la droga," Cronica, 4 August 1988, 12.
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over the significant increase in illegal drug cultivation,
production and transhipment.70

Accusations have been made

that corruption related to narcotics reaches into the highest
levels

of

government

and

society.

Alfonso

Cabrera,

a

presidential candidate in 1990 and close friend of Vinicio
Cerezo was repeatedly implicated.71
anti-corruption
arrests

of

office

close

has

been

associates,

The chief of Cerezo*s

incriminated

illustrating

through

the

the

extensive

corruption.72
The

military

has

narcotics trafficking,

increasingly

been

connected

with

in spite of its close collaboration

with the U.S. in the war on drugs.

The U.S. has turned to the

armed forces in Guatemala as the only viable institution for
help in the fight against drugs.

As in other Latin American

countries, in turning to the military, the U.S. may be helping
to create a new mission for the armed forces.
and

1970s,

the

In the 1960s

focus of the military mission centered on

70United Nations, International Narcotics Control Board,
Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1990.
37.
71CERIGUA,
"War on Drugs,"
3;
"Amapola,
lindisima
amapola," Cronica. 28 July 1989, 15-16; Kenneth Freed,
"Guatemala Seen Slipping into a Haven for Drugs," Los Angeles
Times. 30 August 1989, in ISLA; Lindsey Gruson, "Finding a
Lush Home in Guatemala Drug Trafficking and Poppy Growing,”
New York Times. 1 October 1989, in ISLA; and Robert H.
Trudeau, "Guatemala," (1992).
72Freed,
"Haven
for Drugs;"
and John McClintock,
"Colombians Turn to Guatemala for Cocaine Smuggling," Miami
Herald. 23 November 1989, in ISLA.
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internal security.

With the changing context of transition to

civilian government and changing world politics, the military
faced a reassessment of its central mission.
becomes

the

military's

new

mission,

democratic system are evident.

If antinarcotics

the

dangers

to

a

This would lead to increased

military intelligence activity, as well as expanded roles in
police activities, politics and decision-making.73
Repeated

claims

have

also been

trafficking with guerrilla groups

made

linking

inside Guatemala.74

drug
The

validity of these accusations is questionable and is denied by
URNG leaders.

No conclusive evidence exists.

This allows the

Guatemalan military to pursue counter-insurgency with US help
under the guise of fighting a war on drugs.75
the military,

In turning to

the U.S. dependence on army intelligence may

have increased the opportunity for corruption in the military,
with involvement in operations dealing with cocaine money.
The

military

may become

more corrupt

collaboration with the U.S. provides.

with

advantages

In spite of this, the

^Louis W. Goodman and Johanna S.R. Mendelson, "The Threat
of New Missions: Latin American Militaries and the Drug War,"
in The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military
Relations in Latin America, eds. Louis W. Goodman, Johanna
S.R. Mendelson and Juan Rial (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1990), 189-193.
74Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S_,.
Narcotics Control Programs Overseas: A Continuing Assessment,
100th Cong.,
1st sess., 1987, Committee Print, 5; and
"Lindisima amapola,” 15.
^CERIGUA, "War on Drugs,” 2, 6.
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U.S.

claims

that

although, some

military

involved in illegal drug trafficking,
whole is not.76
may

be

example,

officers

may

be

the institution as a

Commanders of certain remote or border zones

particularly

susceptible

to

corruption.77

ten drug smugglers were arrested in 1990.

For
Their

leader, Colonel Marco Antonio Lopez, was second in command of
the

Quiche

traffickers

army
pay

base.78It

$50,000

is

reported

that

for each flight which

Colombian
stops at a

Guatemalan airfield en route to the United States.79
The

occasion

for

graft

in

the

area

of

narcotics

trafficking for the Guatemalan armed forces appears to be wide
open, aided by the special relationship in this area between
the U.S.

and the Guatemalan military,

ie. U.S. reliance on

Guatemalan military intelligence and cooperation.

The army’s

special role in the economic life of the country, as well as
possible and continued
transhipment,

gives

involvement

added

in drug production and

incentive

for

the

military

to

protect its autonomy and its control of the countryside (used
for clandestine transhipment and production).

76Colum Lynch, "U.S.:
Guatemala Army Must Fight Drug
War," Miami Herald. 30 April 1990, in ISLA; Gruson, "Pinning
Hopes;'1 and Trudeau, "Guatemala," (1992).
^Freed, "Haven for Drugs."
78CERIGUA, "War on Drugs," 6, 9.
^David Adams,
"U.S.
Intensifies War on Drugs in
Guatemala," Miami Herald. 10 July 1989, in ISLA; and CERIGUA,
"War on Drugs," 10.
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DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY
As mentioned above the military and its officers are
prominent economic players in Guatemala, but not all military
personnel

benefitted equally.

The greediness of officers

based in Guatemala City, where more opportunities for graft
existed, caused discontent among junior officers in the rural
areas.80

In

addition,

these

junior

officers

resented

carrying out the costly counterinsurgency campaign while not
sharing equally in the spoils.81
Divisions

also

existed

over

just

what

acceptable to destroy the guerrillas.82

were

It seems that the

goals of the military were fairly uniform,
caused some dispute.

tactics

but the methods

The necessity of removing subversives is

a given, but using tactics like the scorched earth policy of
eradicating peasants that could form bases of support for
guerrillas

caused

dissent.

The

Guatemalan

military

sees

itself as the guardian of the state, but also as a director of
internal

policy,

not

communist insurgents.

only

that

dealing

with

eradicating

Although there may be a few officers

who believe in civilian rule, more often than not, they simply
understand that a nominal civilian government is necessary for

80Painter, False Hope. 51.
81Barry, 44-45; and Jennifer Schirmer, "Waging War to
Prevent War," The Nation. 10 April 1989, 479.
82Bowen,

"Prospects for Liberalization," 44; and Barry,

44.
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international reasons.83
So, while still dominating the bureaucracy and the state,
the military can leave behind some of the details of every day
issues and concentrate on counterinsurgency.
leaders

provide the

international

external

environment.84

The civilian

face Guatemala needs
Although possibly

in the

overstated

that, "Cerezo provides a veneer of legitimacy to the murderers
-

the

Guatemalan

army,"

the

point

cannot

be

entirely

denied.85
A retreat

from direct government could cause

debate within the military.

further

First of all, since divisions

exist over how to handle the counter insurgency war, and the
military now has more time to devote to this, greater problems
may arise.

Secondly, the choice to allow a civilian elected

president has also presented another cause for disunion.

At

least one group of lower to middle officers, hard liners on
the counterinsurgency issue, see the officers important in the
new regime

as

being

Cerezo1s party
translates

into

—

agents

of

civilian president Vinicio

the Christian Democrats.
being

"instruments

of

the

To them this
Communists."86

83Trudeau, "Guatemalan Election," 99; Painter, "Civilian
Garb," 819; and Schirmer, 478-479.
^Lernoux, "Military Order," 557.
85Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B266.
86Schirmer, 479.
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Although this group may be a minority, debate continues within
the military as to the extent of the political opening, and
some do believe that Defense Minister Hector Gramajo went too
far

in his relationship with President Cerezo.87

The two

coup attempts of May 1988 and May 1989 were directed as much
against

Defense

Minister

Gramajo

as

President

Cerezo,

reflecting the continuing divisions between hard and softliners within

the military.88

These divisions within the

military will be part of the dynamic in the relationship with
the civilian government in the process of transition.

87Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B268.
88Richard Boudreaux, "Revolt in Guatemala, While Easily
Quelled, Points to Wider Grievances," Los Angeles Times, 18
May 1989, in ISLA.
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CHAPTER THREE

ESTABLISHING PREROGATIVES
Before the
president

in

established
Several

installation of Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo as

1986,

the

military

prerogatives,

prerogative

already

areas

issues

can

of
be

had

historically

potential

conflict.

identified:

security

issues, accountability for past and continuing human rights
abuses by the military, control over military structure and
the power to define the military's role in society.

Some of

these prerogatives were made very explicit by the military
prior to the transition (see below), while others were less
visible.
The

range

of

security

issues

claimed prerogatives is large.
a

free

control

hand
of

military,

to

the
and

continue

resistance

(Guatemalan National
issues

are,

of

the military

Included in this category are

the

countryside,

for which

counterinsurgency

the

to

intelligence

talks

with

campaign,

role

the

of the

guerrillas

Revolutionary Unity ■
— * URNG).

course,

interrelated,

arbitrary broader categories.

as

are

the

These

somewhat

Human rights concerns are very

closely related to security issues.
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The main prerogative is

amnesty

for past military

violators

for

crimes

committed

during the counterinsurgency war; however, it also includes a
clear-cut statement that the military is not subject to the
civilian legal system or is immune.

Throughout Cerezo's term

security forces remained free from punishment through civilian
courts (to be discussed below under HUMAN RIGHTS).
The

military

wanted

to

retain

control

over

its

own

structure, be free to decide its role in society, and to have
power over the President in the area of military promotions.
All of these prerogatives were subject to change in magnitude,
contributing

to

a general

military relations.

sense

of

the

nature

of

civil-

Before examining each of these areas over

the course of Cerezo*s presidency, as well as indications of
conflict such as coup attempts, it will be useful to point out
the visible, obvious conditions imposed by the military before
the transition.

These conditions clearly identify several

areas where the military felt it held a strong prerogative.

LIMITATIONS BEFORE INAUGURATION
Since 1966 elections in Guatemala have
provided
legitimacy
for
counter
insurgency
programmes
and
have
not
announced major
shifts
in political
power.
There was little to suggest in
the victory of the DCG that the 1985
elections marked a significant departure
from the pattern.1

1Painter, "Civilian Garb," 844.
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It is clear that the military intended to control the
Guatemalan state even after a transition to elected civilian
government.

Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo believed that, upon taking

office in 1986, he would hold 25 percent of power and end his
term with 75 percent.2
military

still

Whether this was true or not,

called the

shots.

Facing this

the

situation,

Cerezo noted in his inaugural address:
Authority does not mean power. These are
two very different concepts. Power must
be subordinated to authority, because
power without responsible authority is
tyranny and many of those who preceded us
apparently did not know the difference.3
Before

allowing

for

the

installation

of

a

civilian

president, the military took measures to protect itself and
limit civilian authority.

Most

importantly,

perhaps,

the

military declared a general amnesty for past violators of
human

rights

during

the

counterinsurgency

war,

establishing immunity from prosecution.4 Thus,

2John H. Fish, "A 'Democratic Opening'
The Christian Century. 11 May 1988, 470.

firmly

Cerezo could

in Guatemala,"

3Vinicio Cerezo, "Inaugural Address" (14 January 1986),
in Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record vol. 5,
ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988),
C195.

4Fish, 470-471; and Marjorie Miller, "Families Call for
Justice for Guatemala's Missing," Los Angeles Times, in ISLA.
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not prosecute military officers for political crimes.

The

military also legalized its control of the countryside, and
provided for the establishment of the State Security Council,
to be headed always by the army secretary of intelligence
(clearly identifying control in the area of intelligence).
This was designed to limit the control of civilian Cabinet
members, under whose jurisdiction certain national security
issues would otherwise have fallen.

In return for working

within these limitations, Cerezo hoped to be able to serve out
his term.

But, the military held the power and the political

murders continued.5

In fact, as a result of the political

opening with the election of Cerezo,

the death toll rose.6

After an initial decline at the beginning of the civilian
administration, political violence rose throughout the term,
and intensified at the time of the elections in late 1990.7

HUMAN RIGHTS
Although

murders

by

the

military

were

less

than

in

periods before the transition, they continued after Cerezo's

5Nairn and Simon, 13-14.
6Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B266.
7Amnesty
International,
"Guatemala:
Amnesty
International's Current Human Rights Concerns" AMR 34/01/91
(January 1991), 1; and Human Rights Watch, "Guatemala," in
Human Rights Watch World Report 1990 (New York: Human Rights
Watch, 1991), 170.
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inauguration.8
journalists,

Academics,

street

students,

children,

trade

politicians,

unionists,

and

especially

human rights activists were the principal targets as the human
rights situation deteriorated throughout his administration.9
Considerable deterioration,
into
U.S.,

1990,

which began in 1989,

as the traditional brutality

persisted

continued.10

The

initially supportive of the civilian administration,

publicly

criticized

Guatemala

in

1990.

In

March,

U.S.

Ambassador Thomas F. Strook was recalled to Washington for a
short time as a rebuke,
before he left.11

openly criticizing the government

The U.S.

State Department reported that

the escalating violence in Guatemala was primarily a result of
a

lack

of

government

authority

over

security

forces.12

Though Defense Minister Gramajo may have been Cerezo*s ally,
no military consensus existed recognizing the necessity of
ending the violence.

Without such an understanding, Gramajo

8Dan Williams, "Guatemalan's 'Honeymoon' May Be Over,"
Los Anaeles Times, 17 February 1987, in ISLA.
9Amnesty International, 1; and Human Rights Watch, 170.
10Richard Millett, "Limited Hopes and Fears in Guatemala,"
Current History (March 1991): 127.
11Lewis H. Diuguid, "U.S. Recalls Ambassador in Rebuke to
Guatemala on Human Rights," Washington Post, 8 March 1990, in
ISLA; and Trudeau, "Guatemala," (1992).
12Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1990 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1991), 631.
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did not possess enough control over the military to stop the
abuses.13

Military

unchecked,

and

deliveries

were

as

human
a

rights

result,

suspended

in

abuses

U.S.

continued

military

December

of

almost

assistance

1990.14

The

historical legacy of human rights violations by the military
carried on as a hard line approach seemed, to be returning, a
result of shifts in the military command

(to be discussed

below) .15
President Cerezo and his civilian government were unable
to

hold

the

military

accountable

violations or continued abuses.

for

past

human

rights

Early in his presidency,

Cerezo made a move against the police force's Department of
Technical
notorious

Investigations

(DIT).

This

organization

for its involvement in political murders.

was
Both

civilians and the military recognized the corrupt nature of
the DIT,
essence

which

lacked support within the military,

allies,

February

4,

special

police

in

1986,

the

face

of

Cerezo's

or

action.16

in
On

the DIT1s offices were penetrated by a

battalion,

organization were detained.

13Richard Millett,

and

the

600

agents

of

the

Only 115 were discharged, while

phone interview by author,

16 March

1992.
14U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports," 631.
15Trudeau, "Guatemala," (1992).
16Richard Millett, phone interview by author.
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the rest were offered retraining and new positions in the
police force.

Although agents were fired,

prosecution was not set.17

a precedent of

Prosecution of DIT members would

have set a precedent too similar to the prosecution of other
uniformed officers, such as the military.18

In consideration

of military opposition, though, it seems that Cerezo discarded
plans to name a civilian to head the national police,

and

named a retired colonel instead.19
Striking

the

DIT,

however,

was

very

different

than

censuring the military, as the following illustrates:
However infamous, the DIT was only a
subordinate organ that executed orders.
Cerezo has cured a symptom, but the
cancer remains.
At the heart of the
terror apparatus, in Guatemala, is the
military, studiously preparing its lists
of
victims
through
the
army's
intelligence services (G-2).20
Although Cerezo announced that he would establish a commission
to investigate the fate of the disappeared,
stated

course

of

avoiding

prosecution

of

he stayed his
members

of

the

17Robert J. McCartney, "Guatemala's New Ruler Moves
Gingerly on Rights and Economy," Washington Post, 12 March
1986, in ISLA.
18Richard Millett, phone interview by author.
19Stephen Kinzer, "Guatemalan Stays in Step With Army,"
New York Times, 11 May 1986, in ISLA.
20Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala," in Latin American and
Caribbean Contemporary Record vol. 5 , ed. Abraham F . Lowenthal
(New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), B310.
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military.21

The

office

of

Human

Rights

Ombudsman

was

created, but remained ineffectual, along with the Human Rights
Commission.22
Under the provisions of Esquipulas II, Guatemala, along
with the other Central American states, made a commitment to
engage

in

a

existence,

national
the

accomplished
Esquipulas
opposition.

dialogue,

talks

held

with

The

amnesty

little.
II

applied

but

to

the

although
the

armed

decreed

military

formally

as

in

opposition
as

part

well

as

of
the

Considerable doubt as to the government's ability

to ensure guerrillas safety has resulted in few guerrillas
willing to lay down their arms and turn themselves in.23 The
situation of conflict continued to deteriorate in 1989 and
1990 as well.24
There
prerogative
government

was

no

(human
did

just

need

for

the

Army

rights),

because

what

military

the

to
the

contest
new

wanted.

this

civilian
The

new

President made it clear that decree 8-86, the general amnesty

21Kinzer, "Guatemalan Stays in Step."
22Trudeau, "Guatemala,11 B249-250.
23LASA Commission on Compliance with the Central America
Peace Accord, 15 March 1988, "Extraordinary Opportunities . .
and New Risks,
" in Latin American and Caribbean
Contemporary Record vol. 7, eds. James M. Malloy and Eduardo
Gamarra (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990), C14, C16-17, C2930.
24Richard Millett, "Limited Hopes," 127.
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for the military, would not be repealed.25
term in office,
human rights

During Cerezo*s

not one military officer was convicted for

violations.26

After the

Center

for Criminal

Justice at Harvard Law School spent two years attempting to
aid Guatemala in improving the administration of justice with
little success, the director of the Center concluded:
It seems clear to us that the current
government of Guatemala is prepared to
tolerate the familiar, terrible forms of
violent
repression— disappearances,
torture,
and
death— carried
out
by
private groups or dissident security
forces or, perhaps by the highest levels
of army intelligence.27
In the only

case where police agents were convicted,

the

decision was later overturned, upholding a tradition of no
accountability
forces.28
officers

for

human

rights

violations

"They are proud of their
are not prosecuted

impunity:

by

security
Guatemalan

for crimes against civilians.

They are proud of the fear they inspire."29

25Richard Millett, "Guatemala," B303.
26Joyce Hackel, "Guatemala Shifts Right With Choice of
President," Christian Science Monitor. 8 January 1991, in
ISLA.
27Philip Benjamin Heymann, "Letter to President Vinicio
Cerezo," Hemisphere (Fall 1990): 9.
28Amnesty International, 1; and Human Rights Watch, ISO181.
29Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B267.
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U.S. ROLE
"Guatemala is a proud, independent country that dares say
'no* to the Yankees."30

In 1977, the Carter administration

suspended military aid to Guatemala because of a horrible
human rights record.31

The military refused the U.S. aid in

anticipation of the cutoff and Carter administration demands
that human rights be improved, illustrating the independent,
at times belligerent,

attitude which continues today.32

It

is reported that as a result of the U.S. aid cutoff, ". . .
some

top

military

unexpected response:

commanders

here

[Guatemala]

gave

an

They laughed."33

Was the suspension of U.S.

military aid effective in

promoting a transition to civilian government in Guatemala?
Many times aid is used to try to further the foreign policy
goals of the donor state by influencing the recipient.

An

examination of what the aims of the U.S. were in withholding
aid, what the outcomes were, and what part the aid actually
played could help in evaluating the impact of U.S.
assistance on the transition.

foreign

The following describes the

30Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala," (1990), B262.
31Department of State, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service:
Latin American Daily Report (5 August 1986), P13.
Hereafter cited as FBIS.
32Perera, "Uzi Diplomacy," 40.
33Brook Lamer, "Army Flaunts Its Independence," C h m stlan
Science Monitor, in ISLA.
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goals of US foreign assistance:
The ultimate,
but usually unstated,
justification for all forms of foreign
assistance is to gain political influence
for the United States within a particular
Third World country.
The logic of
foreign aid in this context is relatively
simple:
The greater the amount of U.S.
economic and military aid to a Third
World country, the greater that nation's
willingness to comply with the foreign
policy wishes of the United States.34
The problem is that aid does not work exactly in this way.
Although some influence is gained for the U.S. through aid,
the

recipients

retain

a

degree

of

independence,

necessarily proportional to the amount of aid received.
World

states

have

a wide

range

accepting aid from the U.S.
from the U.S.,

in

their

actions

not
Third

despite

For example, even with threats

Guatemala would not ratify a U.S.-sponsored

document condemning Nicaragua for much destabilization in the
region.35
One

of

the

U.S.

democratic government.

goals

in

Guatemala

was

to

see

a

In 1984, elections were held for a

Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution and prepare
for

the

scheduled

elections

in

19 85 .36

Thus,

Guatemala

34Doug
Bandow,
"Economic
and
Military
Aid,"
in
Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third
World, ed. Peter J. Schraeder (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1989), 80.
35Ibid. , 81.
36Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala," (1988), B299-B301.
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seemed to be moving in a promising democratic direction, with
hopes for civilian rule and the curtailment of human rights
abuses.
Stated U.S. goals are not always the only objective in
granting assistance.

The Carter administration focused on

promoting development

issues and human rights,37 while the

Reagan White House claimed to support transition to democracy.
The Reagan administration also had a much more favorable view
of Guatemala than the Carter White House.

Reagan was seen in

Central America as meaning more direct U.S. aid,38 though the
U.S. Congress still opposed military aid to Guatemala because
of continued human rights abuses.39

The stated goal of the

Reagan administration may have been secondary to securing
stability in Guatemala.
military
helping

aid helped
Cerezo

stay

After Cerezo was inaugurated, U.S.

stabilize
in

the

office.

system
The

in Guatemala

assistance

aided

by
in

placating the military.40
The way in which Guatemala obtained military equipment

37Dario Moreno, U.S.
Endless Debate (Miami:
Press, 1990), 23-24.

Policy in Central America:
The
Florida International University

38FBIS (13 November 1984), P8.
39Gordon
L.
Bowen,
"Guatemala:
A New
Form
Totalitarianism?" Commonweal, 10 February 1984, 78.

of

40Thomas Carothers, "The Reagan Years:
The 1980s," in
Exporting Democracy:
The United States and Latin America
Themes and Issues, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1991), 100-101.
67

during U.S. sanctions introduces a complicating element.
military goods were sent to Guatemala quietly,
wishes of the U.S.
rights

abuses

of

administration

Congress.
the

appears

against the

While downplaying the human

military
to

Some

have

in

Guatemala,

been

the

secretly

Reagan

supplying

military aid until the election of a civilian, Vinicio Cerezo,
when open military assistance could be resumed.41
Another source of military goods and advisors was Israel.
Israel

became

Guatemala's

administration cutoff.

main

supplier

after

the

Carter

Not only did Israel supply military

hardware, but training and advisors in the counterinsurgency
as well.

The U.S. had found a surrogate for sending aid to

Guatemala, along with other Third World states.42

It can be

argued that even if the U.S. did not encourage these transfers
to Guatemala, they could have been stopped.

Israel is very

dependent on U.S. aid, and it would be difficult for Israel to
make arms

sales which the U.S.

disapproved of.43

Further

exerting its independence, Guatemala built a munitions factory
for its Israeli-made rifles.44
At any rate, the Guatemalans did not seem too troubled by
the lack of U.S. military aid.

As has been noted,

41Nairn, 20-22.
42Perera, "Uzi Diplomacy," 40, 43.
43Nairn, 22.
44Larmer, "Flaunts Independence."
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•Elections are to impress the gringos, ' a
prosperous businessman said.
'It's the
only way we can get U.S. foreign aid
again. But we'll get by in any case. We
have the Israelis and the Taiwanese.,45
There is indication that the military did not suffer from the
loss of U.S. military aid.

Funds which might have gone into

development projects were used to purchase military equipment,
so other sectors of society suffered, not the one targeted by
the U.S.46
Even after U.S. military aid was restored with elections
for civilian government (see TABLE 5, Chapter Two), relations
between the two were not smooth.

One area which created

tensions between the two countries was Nicaragua.

While the

Reagan administration was actively seeking to overthrow the
Sandinistas, Guatemala followed a policy of active neutrality.
President Cerezo played an active and independent role in
Central America, which irritated the U.S.
policy

involving

the

idea

that

it

was

Cerezo followed a
possible

for

a

democratic government to coexist with a pro-Communist regime
in Central America.47
independent stance.

Guatemala continued its historically

With regards to Guatemalan policy on the

Sandinistas it has been said:

45Victor Perera, "Chaos
Nation, 28 January 1984, 93.

in

the

46FBIS (8 August 1988), 13.
47Millett, "Guatemala," B308-B311.
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Scorched

Earth,"

The

It might change in the future . . . at a
price.
As Guatemalan officers are fond
of
saying,
there
are
expensive
prostitutes, there are cheap prostitutes,
and there are the Hondurans, who give it
for nothing.
If U.S. officials want
their
help,
they
must
first
pay—
providing far more generous assistance
than Congress was willing to grant in
1985.48
But Cerezo continued his diplomatic efforts in the region,
without

serious

reprisals

from

the

U.S.49

It

was

more

important as part of the anti-Sandinista campaign to be able
to portray Nicaragua as the only non-democratic government in
Central America.

For this reason,

the civilian government

could not be allowed to fail.50
Some have argued that President Cerezo,
leading

role

in the

in playing a

Central American Peace process,

also

attempted to gain leverage with the military in Guatemala.
Measures provided for by Esquipulas II called for free and
fair elections, national reconciliation, dialogue with armed
opposition and respect for human rights.
observed,

would

lessen

military

These provisions, if

control

of

the

political

system.51
Although the U.S. withheld military aid longer than other

48Gleijeses, "Guatemala," (1988), B307.
49Gleijeses, "Guatemala," (1990), B262.
50Millett, "Guatemala," B311.
51Dario Moreno, Struggle for Peace in Central America
(Gainsville: University of Florida Presses) forthcoming.
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forms of assistance, Guatemala does not seem to have suffered
enough to cause a change in policy.
government

elected,

transition

look grim.52

attitude,

in

but

spite

of

the

The U.S. saw a civilian

prospects

for

a

meaningful

Guatemala retained an independent
past

sanctions.

U.S.

efforts

at

influencing Guatemala through aid were not effective.

MILITARY BUDGET
As TABLE 6 illustrates, the military budget in relation
to total government expenditures rose significantly in the
five years prior to the transition.
budget began to

In 1986 the military

level out in comparative terms,

higher level than the beginning of the 1980s.
military

budget

expenditures

as

(not

challenge

percentage

including

appears puzzling.
would

a

foreign

of

but at a

The decline in

total

government

assistance)

at

first

It might be expected that the military
the

civilian

government

to

retain

high

military spending levels.
As a result of general economic crisis, the Guatemalan
government budget as a whole was shrinking in terms of U.S.
dollar value.

The value of the quetzal in relation to the

dollar was allowed to float in 1986, bringing the dollar value
of the budget down.

In the context of a constricting budget,

military expenditures in U.S. dollar value declined after the

52Millett, "Limited Hopes," 125, 127.
71

TABLE 6 (see Note)
GUATEMALAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES
MILITARY
EXPEND
ITURE IN
MILLIONS
OF
QUETZALES

TOTAL
GOVERNMENT
EXPEND
ITURES IN
MILLIONS OF
QUETZALES

MILITARY
EXPEND
ITURE AS
PERCENT
AGE OF
TOTAL

GOVERN
MENT
MILITARY
EXPEND
ITURES
IN
MILLIONS
OF U.S.
DOLLARS

U.S.
MILITARY
AID IN
MILLIONS
OF U.S.
DOLLARS

1981

161

1335.1

12.1%

161

1982

208

1121.0

18.5%

208

1983

231

1015.7

22.7%

231

1984

270

1019.2

26.5%

270

—

1985

371

1039.7

35.7%

371

0.5

1986

378

1663.6

22.7%

201.6

5.4

1987

495

2087.3

23 .7%

198

5.5

1988

645

2530.0

25.5%

246.2

9.4

.— .

1989
9.4
623
2933.9
21.2%
221.2
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament
(New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), 168; Banco de
Guatemala, "Boletin Estadlstico" (April-June 1990), 32; Banco
de Guatemala, "Boletin Estadlstico" (October-December 1985),
32; Agency for International Development, Office of Planning
and Budgeting, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
U.S.
Overseas
Loans
and
Grants
and
Assistance
from
International
Organizations
(Washington,
D.C.:
U.S.
Government
Printing
Office,
1982),
48;
Agency
for
International Development, Office of Planning and Budgeting,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, U.S. Overseas
Loans
and
Grants
and
Assistance
from
International
Organizations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1987), 51; Agency for International Development,
Office of Planning and Budgeting, Bureau for Program and
Policy Coordination, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and
Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 51; International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 41 no.l
(January 1988),
238;
and International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics 45 no. 1 (January 1992),
258.
Note; All figures are given in current prices. The military
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expenditures were taken from the SIPRI Yearbook, and the total
government expenditure figures from the "Boletin Estadlstico."
The author used these figures to calculate the percentage
military expenditures comprise of total expenditures.
The
exchange rates used to convert military expenditures from
quetzales to U.S. dollars were taken from the International
Monetary Fund.
transition, though as a percentage of the government budget
they remained relatively stable (see TABLE 6).
in

military

assistance

spending

made

greater.

the

U.S.

need

military

for

This decline
U.S.

military

assistance

helped

supplement the dollar value of the armed forces' budget.

One

of

the

the

goals

of

the

Guatemalan

transition was to access U.S.

military

in allowing

military assistance.

As

a

result of the election of a civilian president, the U.S. once
again supplied military assistance to Guatemala,

beginning

with a small amount in 1985 and considerable increases in the
following years (see TABLE 6) . Perhaps in preparation for the
transition, the military appeared to pad their budget up to
the time of the transition; however, this does not explain the
drop in military expenditures after 1985.

My argument is that

the decline in government spending on the military (in U.S.
dollars)

reflected

the

overall

shrinking

of

the

entire

government budget rather than civilian attempts to reduce the
military's budget.

In short, obvious challenges to civilian

authority in the area of the budget were not evident.
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SECURITY ISSUES
Several important prerogatives are included in security
issues.

They are related to the military's control of the

countryside mentioned above.

Continuing the violence and

counter-insurgency war, Civil Defense Patrols, and preventing
talks between the government and URNG are facilitated by the
military's monopoly on force.

Although conditions improved in

the

term,

beginning

of

disappearances

Cerezo*s

quickly

picked

up,

political
an

murders

illustration

of

and
the

military's confidence in its position.53
That the military gave up no authority to civilians in
the

countryside was

Defense Patrols.

illustrated

by the presence

of Civil

Even though the new constitution states that

Civil Defense Patrols are voluntary, the rural male population
was still forced to serve by the military or face possible
consequences.

The government failed to protect the rights of

its rural citizens.54
they

were

being

In response to pleas from Indians that

conscripted

into

service,

the

government

reaffirmed the constitutional premise that the patrols are
voluntary,

but

was

unwilling

government

protection,

to

take

action.

it can be dangerous

Without

for people to

53Kenneth Freed, "Rights Abuse Increase Reported in
Guatemala," Los Angeles Times. 25 November 1988, in ISLA.
54Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B266.
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demand their rights in this context.55
Preventing talks between guerrilla groups, especially the
URNG

(Guatemalan

National

Revolutionary

Unity),

the

government, and most importantly the military, has been high
on the agenda.
the

URNG

In the fall of 1986, prospects for talks with

looked

promising,

but

under

pressure

from

the

military, Cerezo reversed his position, ending chances for the
moment,56

On a trip to Spain, he had proposed negotiations

with the guerrillas, but withdrew the offer upon his return to
Guatemala.

The military had published reports and pictures

portraying the brutality of the insurgents and claiming that
talks could not be held with such groups.57
Under
Accords,

guidelines

of

the

Central

American

Peace

Guatemala was to hold negotiations with the armed

insurgency.
military

the

Some symbolic talks were held in 1988, with the

notably

absent.

Without military

support,

real

progress was not made, and by late 1989, the National Dialogue
structure initiated earlier that year stalled.

The National

Dialogue was created as a nongovernmental organization under
the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR). The talks were

55Stephen Kinzer,
"Guatemala:
What Has Democracy
Wrought?" New York Times, .26 March 1989, in ISLA.
56Millett, "Guatemala," B304.
57Williams, "Guatemalan's 'Honeymoon'."
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held

between

religious,

business,

and

party

leaders.58

Fifteen working committees were to discuss social, political
and economic
Dialogue

issues.

was

Part of

that the

the failure of the National

URNG

was

excludedfrom

direct

participation and the military chose to boycott the talks.59
Although talks between the URNG and popular sectors were
somewhat promising, for any future talks to be meaningful, the
Guatemalan military would have to soften its stance toward the
rebels.

In

March of

1990,

Arturo

Isaacs,

a military

spokesman, stated that the armed forces would support Cerezo
in allowing talks with the guerrillas through the CNR without
the rebels first disarming.60

But, with a change in Defense

Minister in May 1990 (discussed in chapter 2) , the military
appeared to be moving towards a harder line with regard to the
guerrillas.

Popular representatives scheduled to meet with

the URNG were warned by the military not to reach agreements
on

too

Bolanos,

many

issues.The

new

Defense

Minister,

General

stated that the Army would not negotiate with the

rebels until they disarmed, and the URNG said that it would
not disarm until

"conditions for true democracy and peace

58Trudeau, "Guatemala" (1992).
59Trudeau, "Guatemala" (1991), B246-247.
"Violaciones de derechos humanos deterioran
nexos con EE.UU.," Centroamerica Hoy No. 38 (23 March 1990),
3.
6°csuCAPAX,
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exist

in

Guatemala.1,61

Although

direct

talks

with

the

military were not held, meetings with other sectors in society
continued.

In September 1990, the URNG met with the Comite

Coordinador

de

Asociaciones

Industriales y Financieras
agreements

were

Agricolas,

(CACIF)

concluded,

Comerciales,

in Canada.

both

parties

Although no

gave

positive

evaluations of the talks aimed at finding a peaceful solution
to the conflict.62
So,

although

effectively
military

kept

had

a

some
real

strong

talks

were

negotiations
prerogative

held,
off

the

the

in this

military

agenda.
area,

The

and was

willing to contest civilian authority, but fortunately not to
the point of removing civilian government.

Public pressure

grew in Guatemala as the military was more and more seen as
part of the problem and not the solution.63

The military

retained a high level of prerogative in this area, and with a
monopoly on force and the ability to veto direct talks between
the

URNG

and

itself,

the

military

effectively

prevented

meaningful discussion with the armed opposition during the
Cerezo administration.

61Ibid.
62CSUCAPAX, "Campana electoral marcada por atentados y
denuncias," Centroamerica Hoy" No. 47 (20 September 1990), 13.
63Ibid.
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COUPS AND CHANGE
Military coup attempts in May of 1988 and May of 1989
provided tangible reminders of the possibility of military
intervention into politics.

On May 11, 1988, two army units

staged a coup attempt, which was quickly put down.

Defense

Minister Hector Gramajo had six officers involved arrested and
three others suspended or retired.64
the coup was directed at Gramajo.
later

granted

amnesty.65

The

This may reflect that

All of the plotters were
coup

plotters

reflected

sentiments of elements within the military unwilling to make
serious

adjustments towards civilian rule.

While Gramajo

still intended to preserve a great deal of military autonomy,
those on the Right or Far Right saw the possible alliance
between more moderate sections of the military and Cerezo as
threatening.

Such an alliance would exclude the Far Right.66

At this point a change seemed to have occurred in Cerezo*s
relationship with the military.

In exchange for protecting

the civilian government from the plotting officers,

Cerezo

reportedly gave up any authority he had over the military.67
After this, Cerezo*s influence with the military continued to

^James LeMoyne, "Guatemalan Army Arrests 6 Officers
Linked to Coup," New York Times, 15 May 1988, in ISLA.
65Hockstader, "Coup Attempt."
^Richard Millett, phone interview by author.
67Freed, "Rights Abuse."
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wane.
Almost a year later on May 9, 1389, another coup attempt
was put down by troops loyal to the government.

Again, the

target was likely the moderate Defense Minister.

The day of

the

coup

attempt,

Cerezo

and

Grama jo

held

a

joint

conference showing the solidarity between the two.
pledged

support

plotters

had

proceeding.68

for
been

the

President,

arrested

announcing

and

news

Gramajo
that

investigations

the
were

In addition, Cerezo claimed:

There
is
complete
tranquillity
and
support for the institutional process, as
is expected from the Guatemalan Army.
That is why we have said that the Army,
as an institution, has complied with its
responsibility.
Only a few individuals
who
had
already
been
punished
for
irresponsibility
or
lack
of
professionalism are involved.
So there
is no problem.69
Although Cerezo lost much of his power in the previous
coup

attempt,

dependence

on

this

second

the

faction

civilian rule.70

incident
of

the

further
military

increased his
committed

to

This reflects Cerezo's accommodation and

weakness in relation to the military*

As an indication of

Cerezo*s position, some of the demands of rebel officers were
met

by

the

administration

including:

.

^ FBIS (10 May 1989), 11-12.
69Ibid. , 1 2

70Boudreaux, "Revolt in Guatemala."
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increased

military

spending, more political officers in key public administration
positions,

military control over police forces,

continuing

Civil Defense Patrols, and closing the political opening for
the URNG.71

As after the first coup attempt,

paramilitary

actions and human rights violations by the army rose.72
Though Cerezo lost influence as a result of the coup
attempts,

it is argued that he did not do enough

beginning of his term to try to tame the military.

in the
This is

the reason for the following allegation:
'Cerezo has had less trouble with the
military than he should have had, 1
comments
one
Western
diplomat
caustically.
'He's done everything but
put on a uniform, and he has less control
over the military than he might have had
because of the way he is dealing with
them. '73
This accusation, although noting a useful perspective, ignores
the

realities

of

political

life

in Guatemala.

Cerezo

apparently never expected to consolidate democratic rule, and
so,

did not vigorously work towards this goal.74

viewing his

term

in office

Perhaps

as a transition period was

a

realistic attitude under the circumstances.

71Barry, 46.
72Paul Kantz, "Guatemala's Reform Effort Is Failing,"
Christian Science Monitor, 23 August 1989, in ISLA.
^Peter Ford,
"Guatemala Inches Forward,"
Science Monitor, 23 June 1986, in ISLA.

Christian

74Stephen Kinzer, "Guatemalan Army Yields Little Power to
Leader," New York Times, 13 May 1987, in ISLA.
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Merely

completing

his

term

can

be

seen

as

an

accomplishment in itself, and any move towards democracy an
even

greater

one,

considering

some views

from within the

military:
*Vinicio is a project of ours —
not
Vinicio himself,
but the return of
civilian institutions,1 a top Guatemalan
Army man said recently.
'This civilian
project is really a military project. We
can defend the country better this way.
That’s why we were the first to press for
elections, and that’s why we want this
project to succeed. '75
Although the military withdrew from political office, this did
not mean that any power was relinquished to civilians along
with government offices.

The military remained as it planned

"the power behind the throne.1'76
The position of Guatemala is similar to that of Brazil.
With unequal civilian accommodation in prerogative areas, the
military
Though

was

this

able

to

identifies

prevail
the

without

pattern

of

much

contestation.

Guatemala's

civil-

military relations, Guatemala cannot easily be classified as
either

solely democratic or authoritarian.

during

Cerezo's

term

was

somewhat

unique

The situation
in

Guatemala's

history, including both democratic and authoritarian elements.

^Stephen Kinzer, "Walking the Tightrope in Guatemala,"
New York Times, 9 November 1986, in ISLA.
76Lernoux, 556.
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CHAPTER FOUR

This thesis proposed to answer the following question:
How have civil-military relations determined the nature of
transition

towards

democracy

in Guatemala

from

1986-1990?

Using Stepan's model, the research reveals that civil-military
relations discouraged a full transition as defined in this
thesis.

As used here, a transition indicates movement from an

authoritarian regime to a liberal-democratic one, meaning that
ruling is based on the consent of society.
situation

in

Guatemala

during

the

Cerezo

Instead,

the

administration

closely resembles what Alfred Stepan describes as unequal
civilian

accommodation,

or

a

"civilian

headed

garrison

state."1

The research presented here indicates that while

military prerogatives were high, open military contestation
was not necessary due to accommodation on the part of civilian
officials.

Examination

of

the

main

areas

for

potential

conflict between the military and civilian government in the
case of Guatemala, led to the conclusion that a situation of
unequal civilian accommodation existed from 1986-1990.
Many issues faced the military in the period prior to

1Stepan, 101.
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withdrawal from politics:

economic decline and an increasing

foreign debt burden illustrated the military's inability to
manage

the

economy

government

effectively;

against

international

citizens

financial

violence

of

isolated

resources

the

military

Guatemala

worsening

the

from

country's

economic situation; and internal divisions within the military
reflected the strains of governing, conflict over return to
civilian

government

and

methods

for

pursuing

counterinsurgency.
The narrative presented in this thesis noted that from
1954 until 1986, with the exception of one presidential term,
the military ruled Guatemala directly.

The coup in 1954,

which brought the military to power, aimed its violence at
progressive or leftist political actors.
decades,

military

attention

elements from politics.

focused

For the next two

on

excluding

these

As a result, guerrilla insurgencies,

such as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG),
developed
governments

in

the

highland

devoted

guerrilla groups,

areas*

substantial

energy

Subsequent
to

military

fighting

these

which provided a rationale for continued

military rule.
In 1982, with the coming to power of General Efrain Rios
Montt,

the military engaged

guerrillas.

in a campaign to destroy the

Rios Montt, a fundamentalist Protestant, headed

a government (1982-1983), which set about permanently altering
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the

organization

of

thousands were killed.

the

countryside.

In

the

process,

Civil Defense Patrols, model villages

and civic action programs were used to gain control of rural
areas for the military with some success.

This facilitated

the transfer from military to civilian government in 1986, as
it placed the military in a position of strength.
General Mejia Victores
overthrew
military
Several

Rios

Montt

discipline
factors

barracks.

in
and

prompted

led a group of officers which

1983.

General

prepared
the

for

military

Mejia

elections
to

reinforced
in

return

1985.

to

The military had been unable to halt economic

decline and faced a tremendous foreign debt burden.

Military

human rights abuses isolated Guatemala internationally,
well

the

as

as dislocating the rural work force and prompting a

decline in the tourist trade.

A constituent assembly drafted

a constitution and held elections which were won by Vinicio
Cerezo Arevalo.
1986.

Cerezo, a Christian Democrat, took office in

At the time of the transfer, the army's strength in

relation to other political actors was at its highest point.
Throughout this period, the Guatemalan military searched
for security and stability.

However,

continued guerrilla

insurgency and conflict among factions within the institution,
exacerbated by the costs of governing,
instability.

added to political

Groups within the military saw a return to

civilian government as a long-term project for stability.
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Civilian government would bring increased amounts of military
and economic assistance, and allow the military to preserve
unity.

Involvement

factionalism

within

in
the

politics

had

military,

and

caused

increased

returning

barracks meant preserving institutional cohesion.

to

the

Returning

to the barracks, however, did not mean surrendering power, as
the military retained the capacity to influence the political
system.
At the time of the transition from military to civilian
government in 1986, the military held a set of established
prerogatives.

A prerogative exists when the military believes

it has the right to control an issue.

Contestation involves

open articulated conflict with civilian authorities over these
issues or prerogatives.

Prerogative areas in Guatemala at the

time of military withdrawal included:

amnesty for past human

rights

the

violations

by

the

military;

military

budget;

control over military mission and structure, domination of the
countryside; and pursuit of counterinsurgency campaigns.

The

latter two were aided by United States military assistance,
which helped the Guatemalan military develop an effective
internal

security

capacity.

In 1977,

the U.S.

suspended

military aid to Guatemala in an effort to promote a transition
to civilian government, though, in my view, the suspension of
aid

was

not

transition.

the

deciding

factor

U.S.

pressure was
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in

bringing

about

secondary to the

the

internal

d yn am ics

The

o f

G uatem ala

time

tensions

the

for

counterinsurgency,
concerns.

the

G u atem alan

the military

within

opportunities

and

spent

armed
graft,

m ilita ry .

in politics

forces.

exacerbated

Divisions

techniques

for

over

pursuing

and the transition itself were important

The military found ruling more difficult than it

had anticipated, and governing distorted military functions.
Withdrawal to the barracks served in some ways to preserve
military unity, but with elected civilian government and the
absence of a significant guerrilla threat, the military was
forced to reevaluate its central mission.
This thesis has documented that the internal dynamics of
the military affected civil-military relations from 1986-1990.
Coup attempts in 1988 and 1989 provided evidence of factional
tensions within the military and dissatisfaction with civilian
government.

To ward threats from the Right, President Cerezo

became dependent upon moderate sectors of the military for
support.

This left Cerezo without much basis to

military

prerogatives,

contestation.
prerogatives

as

evidenced

by

challenge

the

lack

of

As Stepan discussed, high levels of military
and

low

levels

of

contestation

indicate

a

situation of unequal civilian accommodation, or as described
here,

a

civilian

government

unable

to

challenge

strong

military prerogatives.
Open contestation

between

86

the

military

and

civilian

government

was

rare.

Military

human

rights

example, continued after Cerezo took office.

abuses,

for

Although Cerezo

created the office of Human Rights Ombudsman and the Human
Rights Commission, conditions deteriorated in 1989 and 1990.
In other words,
abuses

did

civilian inquiries

not

prevent

into past human rights

continued

responsibility for previous violations.

abuses

or

declare

A clear indication of

military strength in a prerogative area (no accountability for
human rights abuses committed by the military) was President
Cerezo*s declaration that he would not repeal decree 8-86
which granted amnesty to the military for past human rights
violations.
had

been

At the end of Cerezo's term, no military officers

convicted

of

human

rights

abuses.

In

short,

contestation by the Guatemalan armed forces was minimal owing
to the Cerezo government's accommodation.
This

thesis

Esquipulas II,
guerrillas

also

noted that under the guidelines

of

negotiations between the government and the

were

to

be

held.

Meaningful

talks

with

the

Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) were prevented
by

the

military.

Instead,

continuing

counterinsurgency

efforts led to further abuses by the military.

One measure to

control the countryside, forced participation in Civil Defense
Patrols,

remained

problematic,

despite

the

constitution's

stipulation for voluntary patrols.

Indians complained to the

government of conscripted service.

The government, however,
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took no action.

The war on drugs promoted by the U.S. could

represent a new mission for the armed forces in Guatemala and
was used as an excuse for continued military dominance in the
countryside.
countryside

Because the military defined control of the
and

freedom

to

continue

counterinsurgency

campaigns as key prerogatives, the Cerezo government did not
challenge the armed forces in these areas.
As noted in this thesis,
over the military budget.

contestation was not evident

As a percentage of government

expenditures, the military budget declined in relation to the
years prior to the transition, but leveled out at a percentage
higher than that of the early 1980s.

The decline in actual

value of military spending reflected the shrinking of the
government budget as a whole.

My argument suggests that the

decrease reflects constricting government resources rather
than

attempts

by

military's budget.

the

civilian

government

to

reduce

the

Thus, access to U.S. military assistance

became more important to supplement military spending.
The Cerezo government faced two coup attempts which were
easily put down.
forces

and

Gramajo

and

were

They reflected tensions within the armed
aimed

Cerezo.

both
The

at moderate
coup

attempts

Defense

Minister

represented

the

sentiments of factions of the military left out by a new
alliance

between

moderate

elements

represented by Gramajo, and civilians.

88

in

the

military,

Notably, the extreme

Right was

excluded

prerogatives.

and plotted

to retain

its

own

set of

Defense Minister Gramajo achieved a high level

of autonomy for the armed forces by negotiating with these
forces.

As a result, Cerezo became dependent on Gramajo and

his faction of the military for support.
The

high

levels

of

prerogatives

and

low

levels

of

contestation indicate that unequal civilian accommodation was
the pattern of civil-military relations in Guatemala during
the Cerezo administration.

The military continued to play an

important role in national politics.
had to

contend with

policymaking.

the veto power

The civilian government
of the military over

As a result, the military was able to control

issues about which it was concerned without holding office.
Cerezo*s dependence on Gramajo's
forces

further

weakened

his

faction within the armed

government's

ability

to

act

autonomously.
Stepan's model proved useful in a comparative setting.
The areas

for examination were relevant to the Guatemalan

case, and provided a gauge of civil-military relations during
the Cerezo administration.

Using this model, the prospects

for

grim.

democratization

appear

Even

though

the

model

devised by Stepan is dynamic, allowing for change, including
further democratization, this was not the case in Guatemala
from 1986-1990.

Though democratization was not the result of

the transfer from military to civilian government, a change
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did occur.

Perhaps what may better describe the situation is

a legitimation of military rule through civilian government
and institutions.
The situation of Guatemala from 1986-1990 is not unique
and represents broader issues of civil-military relations in
Latin America.
experiences.

Other Latin American states have had similar
With

the

latest

wave

of

transitions

front

authoritarian rule, democracy has had significant ideological
value in Latin America, but with limited results.

Guillermo

O'Donnell describes the problem as follows:
it should be pointed out that
positive
evaluation
of
political
democracy per se and, especially, the
fear of relapsing into authoritarian
rule,
may
make
democratic
leaders
excessively cautious on some crucial
issues.
These include how civilian
governments select and implement policies
aimed at alleviating the more pressing
inequalities of their countries, and how
they maneuver the armed forces into a
situation
of
reasonably
effective
subordination
to
their
authority.
Excessive caution in these domains may
facilitate the transition to limited
democracy (democraduras), but for the
same reason it is likely to generate
regimes too weak and too devoid of
popular support to be viable in the
medium and long run.2
Stepan's

classification of unequal civilian accommodation,

2Guillermo O'Donnell, "Introduction to the Latin American
Cases,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Latin
America, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and
Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986) , 1 1 .
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with civilians proceeding in an excessively cautious manner,
resembles this concept of a limited democracy.
Too

often

the

two

extremes,

democracy

and

authoritarianism, are discussed without the possibility of a
combination including elements of both, what might be called
a "hybrid" or O'Donnell's democradura.

That Latin America

oscillated between cycles of authoritarian rule and democracy
was held as common wisdom.

To better understand the latest

wave of transitions, more refined typologies are needed to
describe regimes that are part free and democratic and part
authoritarian.

In some cases,

democratic institutions may

only provide a mask for authoritarian politics.

One reason

for

allow

discussing

and

identifying

hybrids

is

to

for

equilibrium or stability of a regime type between the extremes
of authoritarianism and democracy.3
Edelberto Torres-Rivas discusses hybrids in a slightly
different terms.
American
democracy,

He describes the recent changes in Central

politics

as

while

still

possible

democracy.

The

relying on authoritarian

possible
elements,

differs from the despotism of previous years in which popular
access

to

participation

and

power

were

not

imaginable.

3James M. Malloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin
America," in Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition
in Latin America, eds. James M. Malloy and Mitchell A.
Seligson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987),
236, 256-257; and Lucien W. Pye, "Political Science and the
Crisis of Authoritarianism," American Political Science Review
84 no. 1 (March 1990): 13.
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Authoritarian

elements

and

the

possibility

together form the possible democracy.

of

democracy

The possible democracy

in Central America combines persistent authoritarianism with
a new type of organization of political life.

The key in

forming a possible democracy is the foundation of a democratic
method of government.

That democracy is seen as an attainable

goal accounts for changes towards possible democracy.4
James M,
directly*

Malloy

addresses

the

issue

of hybrids more

The process of transition in Latin America in the

1980s represents movement towards types of hybrid regimes.
Malloy in essence describes two types or manifestations of
hybrid regimes.

In the first,

democracy,

in an electoral

sense, is combined with an authoritarian style of governance.
According

to

Malloy,

this

type

of

authoritarian

decision

making is prevalent where executives must implement economic
austerity programs.

Policy making in this way does not favor

the type of bargaining among options associated with a liberal
democratic system*

A second variation of hybrid form would be

civilian governments fronting authoritarian regimes in which
the military dominates a civil-military pact.5

4Edelberto Torres-Rivas, Repression and Resistance: The
Struggle for Democracy in Central America (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1989), 143, 150-151.
5James M. Malloy, "Economic Crisis and Democratization:
Latin America in the 1980s", in Latin American and Caribbean
Contemporary Record vol. 8, eds. James M. Malloy and Eduardo
Gamarra (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1991), 149-150.
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James M. Malloy and Eduardo A* Gamarra describe Bolivia
during the administration of President Victor Paz Estenssoro
from 1985-1989 as the first type of hybrid identified above.6
In

order

to deal

with

the

economic

situation

and manage

austerity, Paz Estenssoro resorted to authoritarian decision
making.7

As a result of a pact between the major political

parties,

decisions

made

by

the

executive

or

a

few

decision-makers were legitimated by the legislature.
than

functioning

as

a

law

making

legitimated executive decisions.

body,

the

top

Rather

legislature

Malloy and Gamarra argue

that this may evolve into a hybrid regime where the executive
holds

authoritarian

decision

making

power

while

the

legislature serves to legitimate the system.8
Guatemala represents the second type of hybrid regime.
Even though elections were held,

the guerrilla

weakened and a transfer to civilian

insurgency

government took place,

Edelberto Torres-Rivas describes the situation in Guatemala as
one

in which

the

military

retained

power.

The

government was reduced to public administration,
military made
continued

to

significant decisions.
dominate

the

political

civilian
while the

Though the military
system,

Torres-Rivas

6James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra, Revolution and
Reaction (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 226.
7Malloy, "Economic Crisis," 149.
8Malloy and Gamarra, 226.
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suggests
affecting
Guatemala

that
a

this

may

be

the

transition.9

during

the

Central

American

Torres-Rivas

Cerezo

way

of

description

of

administration

resembles

the

"hybrid" model described by Malloy in which civilians, through
elections, provide a facade of legitimacy for the military.
Formal democratic institutions existed,

while the military

exercised authoritarian power.
This second type of hybrid regime may also be seen in
Peru.
in

Since Alberto Fujimori assumed the Presidency of Peru

1990,

he

legislature.

has

often

ruled

by

decree,

bypassing

the

In the chaotic context of Peruvian politics,

with political violence from both the Shining Path and the
military,

Peru can be seen as a democradura.

Though the

formal institutions of democracy exist, the violent climate
leads to a vital role for the military.10
Peru

has

been

termed

The situation in

Fuj iborizacion11, referring

to

past

events in Uruguay.
During the administration of Jose Maria Bordaberry in
Uruguay,

the

military

accused

Senators

and

deputies

of

9Edelberto Torres-Rivas, Centroamerica: La Democracia
Posible (Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1987}, 174.
10Francisco Durand, "Peru;
Political Stalemate in the
Time
of
Cholera,"
Paper presented
at the Conference
Democracia, Mercados y Reformas Estructurales en America
Latina (Buenos Aires: March 25-27, 1992).
11Carlos Monje
, Lecture,
Florida
University, Miami, Florida, February 2, 1992.
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International

corruption and links to terrorist organizations.
the

military

began

to

believe

that

they

As a result,

could

promote

development and prevent subversion better than the President.
When it became obvious that Bordaberry could not beat the
military, he joined them.

The military had refused his choice

of Defense Minister and the National Assembly would not revoke
a Senator's immunity from prosecution for terrorist links.

In

response, Bordaberry closed the National Assembly and headed
a military dominated regime.12 Thus, the term Fujiborizacion
is

based

in

the

similar

problems

of

ruling

in

Peru

and

Uruguay.
The situation of a hybrid regime does not represent a
full transition to democracy, and possibly does not indicate
that further liberalization is on the way.

What the case of

Guatemala and others may point to is a new equilibrium in the
political systems of Latin American states, somewhere between
authoritarianism and democracy.

In the Guatemalan case, the

military affects policy through civilian government.

If the

military refrains from direct intervention into politics, this
"hybrid" system has the potential to remain stable for some
time.
The identification of Guatemala as the second type of

12Charles G. Gillespie,
"Uruguay's Transition from
Collegial Military-Technocratic Rule," in Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell,
Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 175-176.
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hybrid discussed in this chapter provides a confirmation of
the validity of Stepan's model.

The hybrid is in essence

Stepan's unequal civilian accommodation.

Both terms refer to

military dominated regimes with weak civilian authority and
formal democratic

institutions.

Thus,

Stepan's model was

useful in identifying the nature of civil-military relations
in Guatemala during the Cerezo administration.
If the situation changes in the future, Stepan's model
provides an explanation.
shifts

based

contestation.

on

The model is not static and explains

differing

levels

of

prerogatives

and

A shift to a harder line within the military,

for example, could lead to higher levels or more extensive
prerogatives.

This could make it more difficult for civilian

government to avoid challenging these prerogatives, leading to
increased contestation.

Such shifts can be discussed using

Stepan's model, allowing a reassessment of a case over time.
As

in

Guatemala,

other

experience this type of

Latin

American

states

"hybrid democratization."

may

Though

these systems may not represent democracy in the traditional
liberal democratic sense,

a type of government,

with many

variations, may be evolving and represent the opportunity for
stability of regime

type.

This

realization

is useful

in

evaluating Latin American transitions, as it provides for a
more realistic goal upon which to judge progress away from
authoritarianism.
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